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Responses to Sexual 
Violence: A Case 
Study of Rwanda 
ISABELLE LAMBRECHT 
 
Sexual violence (SV) often causes survivors to 
experience devastating health, social and 
economic impacts. Framed within Galtung’s 
structural violence theory, Crenshaw’s 
intersectionality theory, and Giddens 
structuration theory, this paper explores the 
relevance of structural violence within two 
community based organizations in Rwanda that 
provide legal justice and economic resources as 
a way to address SV in the country. Both were 
established by the Rwandan government; gacaca 
was established after the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide and Isange One Stop Center was 
established in 2009. Part one of this paper aimed 
to integrate survivors’ personal experiences in 
gacaca with several scholars’ research and the 
Human Rights Watch reports in order to test for 
the relevance of structural violence in gacaca. 
Part two utilizes primary data and several 
scholars to test the relevance of structural 
violence within Isange. Ultimately, this paper 
argues and aims to demonstrate that structural 
violence is relevant in both organizations, and 
therefore is correspondly relevant within the 
global pathology of SV. Given this, it argues 
that structural violence be named as a 
preventable problem. Drawing from Isange and 
gacaca, it provides insight into the ways in 
which survivor-centered support, educational 
campaigns, coordination between Government 
ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and 
the allocation of further resources could be 
utilized to better tackle the issue of SV. 
Ultimately, grounded in the theory of 
structuration, it advances a transformed 
approach to SV at all levels of society in order 
to revolutionize the SV pathology. 
 
Methodology: Part one of this paper uses 
qualitative content analysis to evaluate the 
gacaca court system as the system relates to the 
experiences of women who survived sexual 
violence (SV) during the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. Included in this data are survivors’ 
testimonies. Primary researchers obtained 
informed consent from survivors’ before using 
their stories, and noted that stories were shared 
voluntarily. Survivors reported to these 
researchers that they shared their stories in order 
to integrate their narrative into the broader 
narrative of gacaca, and to prevent other women 
from experiencing similar manifestations of 
violence. In order to maintain an ethical 
framework as a secondary researcher, I avoided 
deceptive practices, and aimed to maintain the 
stories’ integrity by reflecting them as they were 
originally told, and keeping the welfare of the 
research participants’ in mind. When a survivor 
chose to include her name to the primary 
researcher, I used this form of identification as 
well. Part two utilizes primary quantitative data 
that I collected in Kigali, Rwanda during the 
summer of 2018 as well as qualitative content 
analysis. Data were collected at Isange One 
Stop Center (Isange), a government-established, 
multi-sectoral clinic in Kigali, and analyzed the 
clinic’s role in addressing SV. Data were 
collected through anonymous, semi-structured 
questionnaires, distributed to doctors, 
psychologists, and police officers from the 
center, as well as gender based violence (GBV) 
officers at the Ministry of Gender and Family 
Promotion (MIGEPROF). The head of each 
sector within Isange received questionnaires to 
distribute among her/his employees; thirteen of 
the twenty-three Isange staff members were 
interviewed. Questionnaires for Isange 
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employees’ explored: perceptions of the clinic’s 
work in regards to SV, the main drivers of 
GBV, how MIGEPROF continues to work with 
the clinic, and what constraints limit the 
employees’ work with survivors. Questionnaires 
for the government officers questioned: their 
perceptions of Isange’s ability to accomplish its 
goal in respect to SV and how the Ministry 
coordinates with the Kigali clinic. The ethics of 
the data were approved by the Rwanda National 
Commission of Science and Technology. Data 
from part two were analyzed using Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences. The data from 
Isange are not generalizable to all Isange clinics 
present in Rwanda; however, do provide 
nuanced insight regarding the pathology of SV 
in Rwanda. 
 
Theoretical Framework: This paper was 
guided by Johan Galtung’s structural violence 
theory, Kimberle Crenshaw’s feminist 
intersectionality theory, and Anthony Gidden’s 
theory of structuration. Broadly, Galtung 
defines structural violence as violence built into 
structure without a primary actor, which enables 
the reproduction of unequal distribution of 
power, privilege and resources through policies. 
The deficiencies and barriers presented in 
structural violence reinforce inequitable social 
patterns, and most greatly impact those of 
lowest race, class, and gender ranks. Critically, 
the oppressed tend to be limited in their abilities 
to gain coordinated power against the 
oppressors.1 Kimberle Crenshaw’s feminist 
theory adds to this framework, describing the 
interconnected patterns of race and class present 
in structural violence against women. She 
defines the ways that policy undermines the 
ability of women with these intersecting 
identities to launch out of abusive 
circumstances.2 These two frameworks are 
relevant in the context of Rwanda, where issues 
of poverty impact women. They support the 
analysis of the many power dynamics present in 
Rwandan women’s lives that inhibit their access 
to resources and justice following SV. Finally, 
Gidden’s structuration theory complements 
both, describing the dynamic relationship 
between structures and human agency, 
supporting the potential of flexibility, creativity, 
and long-term changes within structures through 
group action.3 His theory is relevant when 
considering the global pathology of SV, and the 
interrelations of community organization, 
political will, and structural shifts.  
 
Introduction: Estimates approximate that as 
many as a half million women experienced SV 
during the Rwandan genocide.4 Testimonies by 
survivors recall gang-rape, rape with sticks and 
gun barrels, the deliberate transmission of 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), sexual 
mutilation, and/or sexual enslavement by militia 
men.5 Adding to the humiliation of the trauma, 
women were often raped in front of their 
children, after witnessing their loved ones killed 
and/or their homes destroyed. While some 
testimonies state that perpetrators killed the 
woman following the rape, other perpetrators 
left the women to “die of sadness”6 and/or 
sexually mutilated them.7 Each exemplifies SV 
as a weapon used to terrorize women in an 
effort to promote the Hutu cause during the 100 
days of the Rwandan genocide.  
The health effects of SV were 
substantial. Psychologically, survivors’ quality 
of life was damaged due to high rates of post-
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
depression.8 Rwandan doctors also reported that 
sexually transmitted infections (STI) were 
particularly common among survivors. 
Literature estimates that 70% of SV survivors 
were HIV+ following the genocide.9 Although 
it is unknown which cases of HIV were 
transmitted through genocide related rape, 
women’s testimonies confirm that HIV+ men 
did deliberately “infect” them with the virus. 
Medical treatment was not widely available, so 
those with the virus faced a high risk of death. 
Moreover, HIV was highly stigmatized, leading 
to social isolation of carriers. Therefore, 
perpetrators burdened women physically and 
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emotionally with a stigmatized terminal illness 
that survivors would be forced to endure 
through death.10 Doctors also reported high 
rates of complications due to self-induced 
abortions as well as pain, infections, and birth 
complications due to sexual mutilation. Since 
sexual abuse and abortion were highly 
stigmatized, professionals state that many 
women did not seek consultation, causing 
further infection and stress.11 
Identity also played a significant role in 
the trauma experienced. Perpetrators of SV, not 
only harmed the individual woman's physical 
body, but also damaged fundamental aspects of 
her Tutsi identity like her ethnicity, religion, 
social class and/or political affiliation.12 Due to 
the social stigma of rape, following the trauma, 
the woman not only carried her own shame, but 
also the shame of her community, adding to the 
complexity of the stress survivors experienced 
following the genocide.13 Additionally, as was 
alluded to previously, SV leads to detrimental 
social stigma throughout Rwanda. SV survivors 
reported that they felt an intense sense of 
isolation and ostracization, and feared that 
speaking out would cause them to be rejected by 
their family, friends and neighbors.14 This 
destruction of social capital caused women to be 
outsiders in their community, impacting their 
sense of belonging, and also limiting their 
ability to marry and build their own family.15 
Connected to the physical and social trauma 
experienced, women faced dire economic 
disempowerment. Many women experienced the 
death of male relatives during the genocide, or 
lost them due to imprisonment. Due to reliance 
on these male relatives, women did not have the 
resources necessary to maintain their 
livelihoods, so they struggled to feed themselves 
and their families, and/or to reclaim their 
property and fix their homes.16 Property was a 
particularly prominent issue as men had 
dominant land rights over women leaving 
women without resources and legal rights, and 
yet with a dire need to reclaim the property 
through a legal process. As the Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) reported, in 1996, the Justice, 
Law Enforcement, Health and Rehabilitation 
Ministries still had not created a coordinated 
strategy to account for womens’ dire 
circumstances.17 
To address the devastations of the Rwandan 
genocide for broader society, the Rwandan 
government established three levels of courts 
throughout the country. These judicial bodies 
included the International Criminal Tribunal 
Court (ICTR), national courts, and the gacaca 
court system. The most in line with Western 
standards were the ICTR and the national 
courts, while the gacaca court was a hybrid 
system that took an alternative approach to 
navigating the legal systems. In sorting which 
crimes went to each court, four categories of 
genocide crimes were established, each 
depending on individual responsibility and 
holding a different penality. The international 
and national courts heard the most extreme 
category one cases, while gacaca heard category 
two through four cases. SV specifically had 
been a category one crime, heard by the ICTR, 
but due to slow processing rates was reduced in 
seriousness and therefore heard in gacaca 
courts.18 
Gacaca’s goal was pitched as a social 
process that offered an alternative approach to 
revealing the truth and ending impunity. It 
favored community engagement, aiming to 
provide healing through the truth and 
distributive justice to survivors.19 Moreover, it 
aimed to reintegrate perpetrators into their 
homes, rather than keeping them locked in 
prison. The community centered hearings, open 
for all community members to participate in as 
witnesses and judges, theoretically fostered an 
environment where evidence was easily brought 
forth and discussed, allowing for an open 
conversation, and thus truth and reconciliation. 
During 2004 and 2005, the government 
established billboards marketing gacaca with 
propaganda stating “the truth is healing.”20 The 
campaign aimed to complement the courts’ goal 
of transforming the harmful ideology that 
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caused the ethnic violence and to rebuild the 
nation—socially and economically.21  
Gacaca left many SV survivors without 
medical or psychological help. Beyond those 
who were not able to access services through 
the system, the majority of survivors did not 
speak openly about their experience due to the 
fear of having to testify or due to the social 
stigma associated with rape.22 This left women 
in a vulnerable position. For instance, survivors 
of SV have far higher rates of PTSD.23 Since 
gacaca’s shortcomings, Rwanda seems to have 
made progress advancing women’s rights and 
roles. Since the genocide, there has been a 
breakthrough in women’s empowerment efforts, 
coming from the top-down. Benevolent dictator, 
President Kagame has been popular for 
presenting gender equality as one of his 
priorities, and for the apparent progress that has 
followed.24 Today, 67.5% of the parliament is 
composed of women—the highest percentage in 
the world. The World Economic Forum ranks 
Rwanda number six for its effort to reduce the 
gender gap, highlighting the ways that Rwanda 
serves as an international leader in efforts 
towards gender equality.25 The United Nations 
(UN) highlights recent domestic laws passed in 
an effort to combat GBV in Rwanda, including 
a minimum requirement of 30% participation of 
women in decision-making at all levels, as well 
as the Gender Observatory, charged with 
monitoring the implementation of gender 
indicators in all programs, at all levels.26 
Legally, Rwandan women now have the right to 
own land and property due to the Inheritance 
Law of 1998.27 The government has also made 
efforts to address GBV through the 
establishment of the Law on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Violence Against Women 
(Rwanda: Law No. 59/2008).28 The law 
includes all forms of intimate partner violence, 
and the minimum penalty is six months in 
prison, while SV oleading to terminal illness or 
death of one’s spouse can lead to life 
imprisonment.  
Still, Rwanda continues to grapple with 
inequalities against women in the health, 
education, and economic realms. In the modern 
day, GBV, the spread of HIV, and the 
interrelations of the two have continued to 
burden women with long term trauma, stigma, 
social isolation, and economic hardship.29 In 
2009, Isange was established under One UN. 
This clinic offers psycho-social, medical, and 
legal services to survivors of domestic abuse 
and SV, as well as women living with HIV. 
Since Isange’s establishment, the UN found that 
the clinic has a significantly higher success rate 
than similar services that had previously existed 
in Rwanda. Still, the report found deficiencies in 
regards to the clinic’s ability to conduct follow-
ups with victims, the consistency of legal help, 
the breadth of awareness raising, and the 
strength of links between the clinic and relevant 
ministries. Ultimately, the UN listed the need to: 
provide victims with more consistent legal aid 
and advice, improve follow-up services, and 
establish better connections with legal 
institutions as well as members of the 
community.30  
Part I of this paper tests for the relevance 
of structural violence within the gacaca system 
in regards to the experiences of survivors of SV. 
Part II of this paper includes my exploratory 
study of Isange, which analyzed the short 
fallings named by the UN, testing for the 
relevance of structural violence. Gacaca and 
Isange are both government-sponsored, 
community-based organizations offering access 
to legal justice and resources for survivors of 
SV. An examination of the shortcomings of 
Gacaca and Isange and the relevance of 
structural violence to these short fallings allow 
for a broader understanding of the ways in 
which structural violence manifests within 
community based organizations. The research 
allows for a greater understanding of the role of 
structural violence in the global pathology of 
SV, ultimately allowing for the public to combat 
it.   
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PART I: Relevance of Structural Violence 
within Gacaca in regards to SV Survivors 
A. Dangers within the Courts: This section 
explores the relevance of structural violence 
within the gacaca system. Scholars, NGO 
officers, and sexual violence survivors alike 
advocate that the gacaca system wasis not safe 
fo SV survivors. For instance, while the 
National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions 
(SNGJ) emphasized the need to mobilize sexual 
violence survivors to bring cases to court, 
scholars and NGO officials argued that gacaca 
as an institution and within the context of the 
culture in Rwanda lead to further harm for 
survivors psychologically and physically.30 A 
2002 survey by the NURC reports “unanimous 
agreement…that the risks of testifying female 
survivors are much greater than those of their 
male counterparts.”31 
One key aspect of harm within the 
gacaca model for sexual violence surviovrs was 
high risk of further traumatization. One survivor 
said, "A negative effect of gacaca is that for 
many people it increases the trauma. Among 
people who had just found a way to cope with it, 
I notice a relapse because they must talk about 
the genocide and they remember the events 
again.”32  Similar to this, Clementine stated “I 
never went to the gacaca court when [my 
rapists] were being tried because I could not 
bear to see them again. I also could not tell the 
gacaca judges [the truth] because the rapists’ 
supporters would have mocked and intimidated 
me. I don’t want to give them the satisfaction of 
seeing me traumatized again.”33 A report from 
the Gacaca Jurisdiction in 2005 validates this 
argument that gacaca led to people experiencing 
further trauma; however, the statistics are not 
able to be separated by gender or gacaca 
crime.34 The 2005 progress report also includes 
statistics of the number of victims who showed 
trauma symptoms during trials. According to the 
report, there were 273 in sector courts, 43 in 
appeals courts, and 637 during the data 
collection phase.35 Trauma counsellors have 
found the majority of survivors reported 
increased emotional and psychological suffering 
after testifying.36 Without engaging in gacaca, 
scholar Brouneus found that gacaca women 
survivors already had higher rates of PTSD and 
depression than men, showing how vulnerable 
survivors who testified were.37 The National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission reported 
that fifty-eight percent of women report that 
they have already "suffered too much to be 
interested in gacaca.”38  
Adding to the psychological harm 
experienced, several accounts advocate that 
survivors also experienced physical dangers 
following their testimony.  Scholars explain that 
violence serves both to silence witnesses and 
also to punish “those who make the mistake of 
testifying.”39 NGO leader stated: Victims fear 
that testifying and consequently exposing their 
experiences of sexual abuse will lead to 
community ostracism, ineligibility to marry and 
other secondary harms not similarly associated 
with the disclosure of non-sexual wartime 
assaults.”40 Survivors’ testimonies echo this. 
One survivor states, “After [testifying at] gacaca 
everything has changed because they even dare 
[to] destroy my house, break my windows.”41 
Another survivor, who was mass raped during 
the genocide at the age of 15 and has one child 
from rape, testified, “I am not safe because the 
people who hurt me have been released from 
prison. After [my gacaca testimony] they came. 
They broke my windows. I was afraid. I thought 
I would be killed. I do not go to gacaca any 
longer.”42 Another survivor explained that after 
testifying, community members asked “if she 
knows when the Interahamwe [the militia men 
who had raped her] are coming.”43 Other 
survivors share that following their testimonies, 
perpetrators brought cows to graze on their land 
plots as a way to jeopardize their access to food 
and to further humiliate them.44 Yet another 
survivor states, “When I wanted to testify, they 
did not want me to give correct testimony, so 
they tried to make me be quiet...They attacked 
my home three time successively. Before 
testifying, there was neither insecurity nor 
8
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attacks.”45 The 2011 Human Rights Watch 
report highlights the theme of these testimonies, 
featuring a significant number of Rwandan SV 
survivors who voiced concerns about retaliatory 
actions and renewed violence.46 
B. Institutional Failings: The physical danger 
experienced and the prominence of stigma and 
social rejection around sexual violence indicate 
the need for protections for survivors who chose 
to utilize the gacaca courts. In fact, records by 
SV leaders tend to document women feeling 
neglected by the government.47 The 
government did offer some security for 
survivors who chose to utilize the courts; 
however, there lacked proper implementation. 
For instance, one amendment to the gacaca 
court laws established that survivors could 
testify in front of a camera rather than an 
audience.48 Gacaca also experimented with 
“women only” courts and courts in which one 
judge heard a survivor’s testimony and then 
reported it back to the full gacaca court.49 
Again, because of inconsistent implementation, 
many NGOs reported survivors were unaware 
of the option.50 Even with the ability to testify 
privately, scholars have argued that gacaca 
sessions were held in public spaces, so 
community members were able to see who was 
entering the building and automatically classify 
them as a rape victim.51 This in turn resulted in 
similar stigma and violence as described.  
Scholars have argued that even further 
protections should have been put in place. For 
instance, NGO officers assert that lack of legal 
representation for the victim was likely to cause 
further trauma as the survivors often had  little 
knowledge of the system, undermining her 
capacity to navigate the legal bureaucracy and 
defend herself during questioning.52 The lack 
of trained judges also jeopardized the safety of 
testimonies, as they did not receive training 
around handling SV in a survivor-centric 
manner.53 Scholars argue that victim 
participation in gacaca was constrained by 
social attitudes towards sex in Rwanda. One 
often used line, to emphasize the degree to 
which Rwandans do not talk about sex, is: "the 
words to describe some sexual acts do not even 
exist in Kinyarwanda.”54 
 
C. Distributive Justice: Along with 
reconciliation, the gacaca courts were also 
theoretically supposed to provide distributive 
justice to survivors. Distributive justice is 
focused on providing support to survivors.  
Thus, reparations are hailed as a vital 
component of transitional justice programs 
because they are the “most victim-centred 
justice mechanism available.”55 The HRW has 
taken special interest in this topic as a way in 
which both domestic and international 
communities might better meet the needs of the 
rape survivors in post-conflict settings.56 In 
1996, organic law mentioned a compensation 
fund for survivors, which was known as FIND; 
however, this fund was never officially 
launched. Draft laws regarding FIND stated that 
gacaca courts were responsible for compiling 
lists of damages to survivors and reporting them 
to FIND. Following, and in accordance with 
gacaca recommendations, the organization 
would award reparations. These lists do exist 
and could have been used to achieve distributive 
justice; however, due to an insufficient political 
will and scarce financing, survivors will likely 
never receive the resources they are entitled 
to.57  
Without said resources, survivors’ 
immediate needs for food, shelter, and health 
care were often left unmet. Personal narratives 
demonstrate the need for distributive justice. 
Emely, a survivor of sexual enslavement and 
tested HIV-positive stated to HRW, "HIV-
positive women who have money simply pay 
for ARV drugs, but other women can't.”58 
Another need of survivors living with HIV was 
transportation to health clinics. This need was 
particularly prominent among the 90% of the 
population living in rural areas and also for 
those who were already too weak to walk.59 
Finally, the lack of distributive justice affected 
the accessibility of the court system. MG, who 
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was facing severe financial distress due to being 
too weak to farm because of HIV explained, “I 
decided to deal with the problems I have . . . I 
thought about going to [a legal assistance 
center], but I wanted to be at peace. And that 
meant dealing with my HIV...and having my 
baby.” Her story demonstrates the compromise 
women had to make between meeting their 
health needs and seeking legal redress while 
surviving on limited resources.60  
HRW found that one third of the 
Rwandan rape survivors interviewed were 
frustrated by the lack of monetary compensation 
after her perpetrator had been convicted.61 This 
statistic contributes to broader notions of justice 
for survivors of SV, suggesting that 
compensation would provide women with a 
stronger sense of justice. Moreover, without 
survivors’ post-genocide needs for health care, 
food, and shelter being met, survivors were 
unable to seek legal redress, build their families, 
careers and communities, and to heal from the 
trauma. Given that many lost their family and 
friends during the genocide, the lack of financial 
resources meant they were without all possible 
supportive means to assist them in rebuilding 
their lives. The proper implementation of 
distributive justice would help mitigate the 
health and economic effects of violence in post-
conflict settings, and provide a desired avenue 
to justice.  
D. Relevance of Structural Violence: Structural 
violence theorist, Farmer wrote: structural 
violence describes “social arrangements that put 
individuals and populations in harm’s way.”62 
Mullen, structural violence theorist, echoes this 
saying that structural violence is “built-in” 
systemic vulnerability and dehumanization.63 I 
argue that the psychological trauma and the 
physical violence endured by survivors who 
utilized the gacaca system demonstrates the 
manifestation of structural violence in the form 
of secondary victimization and punishment of 
victims. While survivors were seeking justice 
and resources through the restorative process, 
they ultimately faced harm without any gained 
resources. As scholars asserted, these women 
faced much greater harm than men who 
testified. As the research demonstrated, 
survivors experienced further violation of their 
human rights following their testimony. While it 
may seem that individual people are committing 
interpersonal harm against the women, theorist 
Kathleen Ho writes that total focus on 
interpersonal violence obscures the underlying 
causation of structural violence.64 Structural 
violence theorists argue stigma unfolds within 
contexts of inequitable power relations, and that 
the stigma that shapes exclusion from social life 
is rooted in structural processes rather than 
individual attributes.65 Theorists have argued 
that stigmatization is entirely contingent on 
access to social, economic and political power 
that allows the identification of differentness.66 
In light of this, I argue then that if SV and the 
act of speaking out against SV were not rooted 
in structural violence in the form of unequal 
power relations between survivors and non-
victims, the process would have been more 
peaceful, and survivors would have experienced 
less harm.  
We witness the reinforcement structural 
violence and further normalization through the 
gacaca model as the harassment and 
endangerment of survivors is not taken 
seriously. I argue that stricter protective policies 
that successfully held people accountable for 
inflicting harm were necessary in order to 
protect the survivors’ human rights. The 
dichotomy present where survivors testified and 
in the process had their human rights 
compromised due to a lack of protective policy 
and social stigma, suggest that the survivors are 
the ones who bear the responsibility of the 
crime when they testify.67 This is compounded 
by the fact that perpetrators were often released 
after survivors’ testimonies as part of the gacaca 
model, causing distress in survivors while 
providing power back to non-victims.68 In this 
phenomenon, I argue structural violence is 
reinforced as the non-victims are not held 
responsible for their wrongdoings, a pivotal part 
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of holding actors within structural violence 
accountable.69 I argue that the lack of 
accountability in the legal system and by the 
government normalizes violent dynamics. Thus, 
this phenonomon reinforces the power dynamic 
of sexual violence, whereby women are 
powerless, men hold the power, and there is the 
silent actor of structural violence, normalizing 
these dynamics.  
Finally, the lack of distributive justice 
suggests that it is acceptable for people who 
were victims of SV to not receive medical care 
and financial resources. Theorists argue that 
poverty, as a form of structural violence, reveals 
in the form of unemployment, lack of education, 
healthcare, food, and shelter. This violence 
inflicts suffering on members of society. 
Especially for those with medical complications 
following SV, the lack of resources causes 
further harm to survivors as they are not able to 
receive medical care. In this case, women were 
forced to face death or the possibility of it when 
they were unable to secure HIV treatment. This 
preventable harm demonstrates structural 
violence.70 In light of other theorists, I further 
argue that a lack of resources reinforces 
structural violence as it forces women to bear 
the responsibility for men’s SV, thus 
normalizing interpersonal violence against 
women as well as women not having access to 
necessary resources.71  
 
PART II: Relevance of Structural Violence 
within Isange in regards to SV Survivors: 
Part II of this paper analyzes the short fallings 
of Isange named by the UN, as listed in the 
Introduction, and tested for the relevance of 
structural violence. The data showed three 
prominent themes. First, there was a lack of 
confidence in the victor justice legal system that 
currently stands. Staff expressed specific ways 
in which the systematic forensic barriers and 
cultural norms limit confidence in the legal 
system. Second, the lack of resources results in 
survivors not only experiencing the trauma of 
sexual assault, but moreover, not being 
financially empowered to leave a dangerous 
situation. Finally, there is a lack of collaboration 
between MIGEPROF’s policy work and 
Isange’s grassroots efforts. An analysis of the 
shortcomings of Isange and the relevance of 
structural violence allow for a broader 
understanding of the ways in which structural 
violence manifests.  
A. Legal Barriers: Zero of the thirteen Isange 
respondents reported legal justice as the 
strongest method to address SV, showing low 
levels of confidence in the legal avenue among 
employees in terms of achieving punitive 
justice. Importantly, the justice being sought 
through the modern day court system in Rwanda 
is focused on victor-punitive, aiming to punish 
perpetrators because it is what they 
“deserve.”72 This form of justice is often 
powerful for survivors, as punishing 
perpetrators can “offer victims the opportunity 
to affirm the ‘wrongness’ of the crime 
committed against them.”73 Moreover, punitive 
justice is linked to deterrent justice, which is the 
idea that “punishment is necessary, not simply 
because perpetrators deserve it, but because it 
should help discourage a convicted perpetrator 
from committing another crime, for fear of 
receiving punishment.”74 This model of justice 
compares to the community-centered restorative 
justice described earlier in gacaca.  
Overall, 75% of staff interviewed 
labelled similar constraints within the legal 
sector. These include (1) social stigma that 
caused a barrier for women to tracking abuse 
through forensic evidence; ; (2) the inability to 
track longevity of abuse.; (3) gender norms 
within the courts; (4) lack of financial 
redistribution. 100% of the doctors and 
psychologists named the collection of forensic 
evidence as a barrier. The evidence requires a 
rape kit, and is necessary to build a strong case 
against a perpetrator. It is essential for rape kits 
to be collected while DNA is still available, 
meaning before the survivor has bathed. 3 of the 
13 staff and 2 of the 2 the ministry officers 
attributed finances as a barrier. For instance, one 
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doctor explained: “women need to be aware that 
the Isange clinic has rape kits available, and 
they must be able to go there during the clinic’s 
workday.” 100% of the people interviewed  
explained that there is serious stigma around the 
topic of rape, and especially rape inflicted by an 
intimate partner. One doctor said: “Many 
believe that it is an issue that should stay within 
the home, and many will not believe women 
who claim to have been raped.” One police 
officer validated this saying: “claiming rape 
often means that women will face social 
isolation and possibly lose economic 
opportunities.” 75% of staff also alluded to the 
overarching cultural reality impacting how legal 
disputes are handled. One employee expressed 
that federal and local courts make it difficult to 
prosecute domestic and sexual abuse cases.  He 
explained: the courts are majority men, and 
traditional, patriarchal marriage values remain, 
where violence [is believed to be] a private 
matter.  
The data from Isange is supported by 
other scholarly research in Rwanda. The UN 
writes: “there are concerns over limited legal 
assistance [in Rwanda] to victims owing to a 
lack of forensic evidence to support cases in 
courts and limited or delayed reporting of VAW 
cases.75 Scholars found that the necessity of 
forensic evidence leads to women’s hesitation 
pressing charges. These scholars found that 
women’s hesitation was entrenched in the belief 
that gender violence should be kept within the 
household.76 Literature supports the connection 
between Rwanda’s culture of silence and the 
hesitation around providing forensic evidence. 
Scholars explain that many Rwandans still have 
the culture of keeping family secrets to preserve 
their family’s image, undermining their rights 
and likeliness to report SV.77  Reinforcing the 
culture of silence, scholars also explain male 
back-lash patterns, whereby women experience 
increased conflict within their relationships 
when husbands felt their roles were challenged. 
These back-lash patterns ultimately further 
undermine women’s capacity to seek legal 
justice.78   
The problems expressed within the 
Rwandan context are not exception, and are 
contextualized by a common theme within the 
global pathology of sexual violence, where 
stigma deters reporting. Scholars found that in 
Nigeria, social stigmatization leads to under-
reporting and thus not collecting forensic 
evidence.  This scholar argues that the lack of 
forensic evidence adversely affected the 
prosecutions of perpetrators.79 In South Africa, 
scholars found that survivors did not seek PREP 
or report the violence because the fear of being 
blamed and not receiving social support had 
profound psychological impact.80 Scholars 
reported that in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, up to 29% of survivors of sexual 
violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) are rejected by their families and 
communities.81 This stigmatization and 
rejection undermines survivors willingness to 
report violence following. Survivors of SV echo 
this sentiment all over the world through local 
press. In 2020, a news article in the United 
Kingdom was published: “Sexual violence not 
being reported by asylum seekers due to 'culture 
of disbelief'.”82 A similar article was published 
in Los Angelos, United States of America, 
titled: “Rape victims: afraid to report crime; 
problem for America is to eliminate the stigma 
of reporting the trauma.”83 In Barhain, a news 
article titled “Social stigma 'barrier to reporting 
rape crimes'” was published in 2010.84 Though 
further research would be necessary to draw 
significant connections between Rwanda and 
other contexts, this broad examination 
demonstrates that Rwanda is not exceptional in 
the struggles it faces regarding SV.   
Beyond the minimal forensic evidence 
report needed to pursue legal justice, research 
suggests doubt of legal systems as an avenue to 
correcting and ending SV. While Rwanda has 
made significant strides including women in 
decision making bodies, scholars have argued 
that in Rwanda, “it is ‘too simple to assume that 
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the participation of women will lead directly to 
fundamental changes in itself and transform 
“the hegemonic order of the legal system.”85 
They assert that men’s roles as economic 
providers and decision making authorities in the 
household hold deep roots continuing to impact 
legal processes.86 Additionally, in a policy and 
legal analysis, scholars write that patriarchal 
norms continue to produce gaps within the legal 
system. They write:  
Given that men have traditionally 
controlled household assets and 
resources, the recent (2013) law, which 
provides equal ownership of land 
between wives and husbands, has put 
many women at risk of domestic 
violence; their husbands can force them 
to sign documents when they want to 
sell land, and women who resist or 
refuse were reported to experience 
violence as a result.87 
Burnet echoes the sentiment that despite 
progress at the top, it is still quite difficult for 
women to claim rights. She explains that strides 
in gender policy conflict with entrenched 
patriarchal attitudes that reflect a more 
traditional society. This means that reforms do 
not always stretch to all levels of society.88 
Challenges accessing the legal system, 
even with forensic evidence, is echoed in other 
contexts that prosecute rape as well. In Nigeria, 
the prosecution of rape is a very demanding 
exercise, because beyond reliable evidence, the 
case also needs witnesses. Given that the 
perpetrator will often stop the violence when 
someone walks in, finding a witness is difficult. 
This scholar also reported that the police 
indulge in poor investigational practices which 
compromise the prosecution of cases.89 
Additionally, health care scholars found that 
despite the increasing implementation of 
standardized rape kits across jurisdictions, the 
medico-legal findings generated by these tools 
are often not related to positive criminal justice 
outcomes.90 
 
B. Lack of Resources:  100% of people 
interviewed stated that there are no readjustment 
services, including rehabilitation services and/or 
safe homes. Since neither exists, survivors of 
violence often return home to the abuse of their 
partner. Staff explain that when the survivor is 
economically dependent on her abuser, there is 
a risk that she will need to continue to be 
dependent on her abuser. 90% of the employees 
advocate that abusers withdraw financial 
support when a survivor reports him. Related to 
resources, 100% staff expressed that there are 
communication barriers limiting the work of 
psychologists and lawyers. Staff explain that 
communication is an important part of mental 
health programming because treatment for 
depression and PTSD takes time to complete. 
Without the ability to adequately communicate, 
psychologists cannot follow up with the 
survivors. Additionally, survivors need to be 
able to be easily reachable in order for their 
lawyer to be able to work with them. Similar to 
psychologists, without accessible 
communication, lawyers are not able to properly 
represent and work with their clients. The lack 
of economic reintegration support as well as the 
clinic’s inability to provide long-term succinct 
treatment, make clear the ways in which the 
clinic is not able to empower survivors long 
term.  
This argument is supported by other 
scholars’ research. Literature cites that women 
in low-income settings have reduced capacity to 
leave violent situations due to dependence on a 
husband for financial security.91 Economic 
factors including women's unemployment, 
homelessness, food and financial insecurity 
have been found to constrain women's 
responses, and ultimately, whether or not a 
woman had a job was seen as a major factor 
empowering her to leave a violent situation. 
Moreover, reporting the violence led to negative 
financial implications because the husband 
would be put in jail, which would end his ability 
to provide for his family, and thus lead to food 
insecurity and homelessness.92 Other scholars 
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support these arguments explaining that 
resource-limited programs have limited capacity 
to support survivors in obtaining safety, since 
they do not have access to formal shelter 
systems or emergency food networks.93 A 
published article for the United Nations 
advocates that the government of Rwanda needs 
to continue to raise awareness of the fight 
against violence against women, and follow up 
on the socio-economic reintegration of 
victims.94 
 
C. The Tensions between Policy and Cultural 
Norms: 100% of Isange staff were unaware of 
MIGEPROF’s economic empowerment 
initiative that promotes technical school 
education for young women. Though this does 
not directly relate to the health aspect of GBV, 
economic inequalities are a driving force of 
GBV. Perhaps, Isange and MIGEPROF could 
collaborate on this initiative together. Nine of 
the thirteen staff stated advocacy and 
sensitization campaigns as a means to address 
and end SV, showing great optimism in 
community-wide efforts. That said, 100% of 
staff interviewed did not know of any modern-
day campaign work addressing SV. This 
compares to the 2 of the 2 ministry officers’ 
stated that there is a “zero tolerance” to GBV 
across all sectors and an anti-GBV law which 
provides severe punishment for all GBV policy. 
Of course, as explained earlier, there are several 
shortfallings to this legal policy. 
The discrepancies within the Isange staff 
responses and the MIGEPROF responses are 
significant because they demonstrate a gap in 
collaboration, and therefore a gap in ending SV. 
Scholars advocate for close partnerships 
between nonprofits and government agencies in 
order to create gender equitable policies, and to 
promote strong outcomes within agencies that 
address SV.95 Close collaboration facilitates a 
strong evidence base that supports policy, 
practice, monitoring and evaluation at all levels. 
Scholars advocate that close partnerships also 
enable effective educational community wide 
campaign work, because bottom-up campaign 
work allows for the roots of SV to be 
addressed.96 For instance, involving men in 
redefining masculinity in order to shift public 
opinion about SV, rather than top-down 
pressure on men to change their behaviors.97 
The UN echoes this stating: widespread 
messaging on GBV through community media 
platforms ensures that the root causes of GBV 
are directly targeted. Close collaboration allows 
for cultural appropriateness. The UN advocates 
that this messaging is therefore has been most 
effectively done with all sectors of society 
involved—from health providers to government 
stakeholders.98  
 
D. Relevance of Structural Violence I argue 
that the gaps explored within Isange 
demonstrate the manifestation of structural 
violence. First, similar to during gacaca, where 
women faced much greater harm than men who 
testified, women are faced at a disposition in the 
modern day when they pursue legal justice, 
since harmful stigma continues to exist. In this 
case, the stigma debilitates: due to this barrier, 
women’s capacity to utilize the court system to 
pursue safety is undermined. Through the 
structural violence lens, I argue that this stigma 
is rooted in structural processes rather than 
individual attributes. As argued in Part D of Part 
I, stigma is rooted in structural violence.99 In 
light of this, I argue tthat if power structures 
between survivors and non-victims were equal, 
the act of speaking out against rape would not 
cause stigmatization, and so the process would 
be more peaceful, and survivors experience less 
harm. While further data needs to be collected 
on the intricacies of Rwanda’s legal system, I 
argue that the lack of confidence in the legal 
system demonstrates structural violence as well. 
Farmer writes that structural violence manifests 
as a lack of legal standing.100 Theorists DD 
Winter and D.C Leighton write: “Structural 
violence occurs whenever people are 
disadvantaged by political, legal, economic or 
cultural traditions.”101 The lack of confidence 
14
Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol3/iss2/1
 Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020 
 
15 
in the legal system, and the correspondent lack 
of empowerment to utilize the legal system, as 
well as the ways in which cultural traditions 
inhibit women’s power all compromise 
survivors’ legal standing. Therefore, structural 
violence implicitly strips survivors of their 
capacity to pursue legal justice.  
 I argue that the lack of economic 
resources for survivors of SV also demonstrates 
the manifestation of structural violence. 
Theorists explain poverty, as a form of 
structural violence, reveals in the form of 
unemployment, lack of education, healthcare, 
food, and shelter.102 This violence inflicts 
suffering on members of society. In this case, 
the survivors of SV experience this form of 
structural violence as many are not able to 
mobilize out of violence relationships due to a 
lack of resources. With a lack of resources 
present, and with women therefore needing to 
accept abusers’ resources, inequitable gender 
norms are normalized and reinforced. The lack 
of resources therefore causes further harm to 
women that is completely preventable, revealing 
structural violence.103 Moreover, in light of 
other theorists, I argue that similar to gacaca, a 
lack of resources reinforces structural violence 
as it forces women to bear the responsibility for 
men’s SV. This ultimately leads to continued 
harm against women and further normalizes 
interpersonal violence against women.104  
I argue that the lack of collaboration and 
between Isange and the government and the 
need for greater education reflect how society 
allows structural violence through the form of 
SV to continue to manifest. Drawing from 
Galtung, structural violence is a social structure 
that perpetuates inequality, thus causing 
preventable suffering. Applying a structural 
violence lens, I argue that social stratification—
systems where people who don’t have access to 
things required to fulfil their needs—is at play 
here. DD Winter and DC Leighton write: 
“Because they are longstanding, structural 
inequities usually seem ordinary, the way things 
are and always have been.”105 Further research 
is needed to establish what is going on that is 
causing the gaps in funding, such as whether it 
is a lack of financial investment on behalf of the 
Rwandan government or a lack of financial 
investment by other stake-holders. Regardless, I 
argue that the lack of collaboration and 
grassroots campaign and education work 
enables SV to continue to manifest. In this case, 
the way society has been—where the 
MIGEPROF and non-profits do not collaborate 
to end SV, and where country-wide education is 
not implemented—ultimately enables further 
SV against women. There is not necessarily an 
individual perpetrator to hold morally 
responsible, but rather, the lack of collaboration 
and grassroots support enables continued 
vulnerability for women. These social 
arrangements ultimately put individuals and 
populations in harm's way, and therefore 
demonstrate structural violence.106 Moreover, I 
argue that the continued passivity enables the 
normalization of violence against women, 
thereby reinforcing structural violence. 
  
Conclusion: This paper provided an in-depth 
analysis of two government-sponsored 
community organizations in Rwanda that 
provide(ed) access to legal justice and resources 
for survivors of SV. This paper analyzed the 
ways in which unequal power dynamics have 
manifested.  While steps have been made in an 
attempt to tackle the issue of SV against 
women, gaps limit the extent to which structures 
are truly affected. This structural violence 
discussed consequently results in harm in 
survivors’ social, economic, and health realities. 
In line with Crenshaw’s theory of 
intersectionality, women survivors’ of lower 
class are particularly disadvantaged. This 
disadvantage is rooted in structural violence 
enabling the manifestation of patriarchal norms 
that undermine women as well as structural 
violence that limits access to opportunities 
based on class. Further research is necessary to 
test for the relevance of other manifestations of 
structural violence in the organizations, such as 
15
et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship Volume III Issue
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020
 Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020 
 
16 
white supremacism and homophobia.  
Ultimately, Isange and gacaca provide us with 
further context in order to understand overall 
themes present within the global pathology of 
SV. Going forward, in order to make strides 
within this pathology that is entrenched in 
structural violence, there is a clear need for 
preventable problems to be examined. Isange 
and gacaca provide insight into the ways in 
which survivor-centered support, educational 
campaigns, coordination between Government 
ministries and nonprofits working with SV, and 
the allocation of further resources could be 
utilized to better tackle the issue of SV.  
In imagining the approach to ending SV, 
whether in our own US communities or in 
global communities, understanding the role of 
structural violence allows us to strategically 
target powerful forces operating within the 
institution of family, state, and civil society.107 
According to the theory of structuration, group 
action plays into the dynamic relationship 
between societal members and overarching 
structures.108  Whether in Rwanda or 
elsewhere, there is a need to determine how 
both internal and external agents can be used to 
challenge structure violence, and therefore 
empower victims of it, and ideally, motivate and 
inspire political will that reduces the harm 
perpetrated by it.109 I argue then that the 
naming of the relevance of structural violence, 
enables the opportunity to re-imagine how SV 
issues are approached, and will allow for 
stronger community organization. This will 
therefore help to cultivate necessary pressure on 
overarching structures that will assist in 
revolutionizing the global SV pathology.110 
Where structural violence is relevant, we know 
that preventable problems manifest. Through 
structuration, we have the capacity to address 
these problems —on large and small scales—
ultimately providing opportunity to improve the 
pathology of SV, and reduce physical, mental, 
social, and economic harm experienced by 
survivors.  
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Experience of Ndi 
Umunyarwanda: An 
Interdisciplinary 
Analysis of Identity & 
Removing Ubwoko 
in Rwanda 




Hutu, Tutsi and Twa: These 
different amoko (“kinds” in Kinyarwanda) have 
shaped Rwandans’ identities for centuries. 
Modern components include post-genocide 
identities and the individuals’ degree of 
Rwandaness. Through 11 in-field interviews 
conducted in 2017, Rwandans’ experience of 
the Ndi Umunyrwanda program was analyzed 
through the intersections of these identities. The 
“I am Rwandan” program was a government-
sponsored, nationalistic campaign that promoted 
similarities in response to the Genocide against 
the Tutsi in 1994. It removed amoko from the 
public sphere for the sake of unity which, 
through this paper, was proven detrimental to 
vulnerable intersects of Rwandans. 
 
 
1 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2001). 
2 “Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country,” 
United Nations, accessed October 2, 2018, 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/e
ducation/rwandagenocide.shtml 
3 “Independence,” The World Fact Book, CIA, 
accessed September 30, 2018. 
 
Introduction 
Rwanda has faced decades of conflict between 
three groups of Rwandans: the Abahutu, 
Abatutsi and Abatwa, which cumulated in 1994 
with the Genocide against the Tutsi. Belgians 
colonized Rwanda in 1916 and enacted a 
“divide and rule” form of domination. The 
colonizers favored Abatutsi in government and 
education while synonymizing the Hutu identity 
with “second-hand citizens.” The Abahutu were 
85 percent of the Rwandan population and, in 
the 1950’s began to use that to their advantage.1 
Violence sparked as Abahutu rose up and killed 
hundreds of Abatutsi, marking the Hutu 
Revolution lasting from 1959 to 1961. This 
period signified the end of Tutsi domination and 
increase tension between the Hutu and Tutsi.2 
In the wake of the Hutu Revolution and 
as other countries announced independence (i.e. 
Congo independence in 1960 from Belgium and 
Tanzania in 1962 from British control), the 
Belgians quickly switched support in favor of 
the majority: the Abahutu. On July 1, 1962, 
Rwanda became an independent state.3 The 
Abahutu used their power to continue 
marginalization of Abatutsi, eventually leading 
to the official peace agreement, the Arusha 
Peace Accords in 1991. This agreement aimed 
to make peace between the Hutu-led 
government of Rwanda and the predominately-
Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).4 During 
the 100 short days of the Genocide against the 
Tutsi in April 1994, the United Nations 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2088.html. 
4 “Peace Agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese 
Patriotic Front,” 
Document Retrieval, United Nations, accessed 
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officially reports more than 800,0005 Rwandans 
were slaughtered by machete; the National 
Commission for the Fight Against the Genocide 
(CNGL) in Rwanda states 1,070,014 deaths.6 
Rwanda looks toward a peaceful future 
and sets outs to heal from the atrocities that had 
plagued the country for decades. Numerous 
grass roots and government-sponsored programs 
have worked to encourage forgiveness and 
create peace in the country. 
Soon after the genocide ended, the 
country sought justice for victims and victims’ 
families through a traditional, grass roots form 
of community healing: the Gacaca Courts. In 
Gacaca Courts proceedings, which were led by 
respected community leaders, “priority was 
given to Rwanda reconciliatory norms and 
values, namely admission, repentance, apology 
and forgiveness.”7 In order to modernize and 
adapt to the more serious crimes which Gacaca 
Courts were being adapted for, an added form of 
punishment was introduced. 
If perpetrators share their whole truth 
including the wrongdoings they committed as 
well as any other wrongdoings they had 
knowledge of, they were rewarded with half 
their prison sentence, with the rest spent in 
Travail d’Interest Generale (TIG; “works of 
general service”). TIG was a restorative 
alternative to imprisonment that focused on 
rebuilding: physically rebuilding the 
 
5 United Nations, “Rwanda: A Brief History of 
the Country.” 
6 “Background,” National Commission for the 




7 Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, 
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 43. 
8 Ndi Umunyarwanda (n-də oo-mo͞ on-ē-ruh-
WAHN-duh) translates to “I am Rwandan” 
communities that were destroyed and rebuilding 
mindsets through educational programs, 
destroying genocidal ideologies and promoting 
reintroduction into society. 
Compulsory, government-led introduced 
and led programs like Ubudehe, Umunganda 
and Ndi Umunyarwanda8 provided opportunity 
for community-centered reconciliation, support 
and self-reliance. Ubudehe was introduced as 
village-level community work “targeted at 
general poverty alleviation buil[t] on traditional 
practices of communal crop planting or house 
building – and is thus labelled ‘a homegrown 
solution rooted in Rwanda's culture’ (NURC 
2007: 96)”9 Similarly, Umunganda began to 
provide government-required, monthly 
communal work supporting the community. The 
work could include cleaning public spaces, 
filling potholes or building roads, maintaining 
drainage, planting flowers and more. 
To complement the actioned-based 
programs outlined above, is Ndi 
Umunyarwanda. 
Ndi Umunyarwanda is a nationalistic unity 
campaign that emphasizes a pre-colonial 
Rwandan identify over anything else, 
specifically targeting an override on one’s 
ubwoko (ubwoko means “kind” in Kinyarwanda, 
in this context it is the categorization of Hutu, 
9 “Becoming Rwandan? The Impact of Two 
Decades of Unity Policies on the Batwa,” 
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, the 
Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace 
and Tilburg University, the Netherlands, 
accessed July 12, 2020, 
http://www.kaowarsom.be/documents/PDF%20
BULLETIN/GOODWIN.pdf; “The National 
Policy on Unity and Reconciliation,” Republic 
of Rwanda, National Unity and Reconciliation 
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Tutsi or Twa, defined in more detail later).10 
This program emphasized that the most 
important part of one’s identity is their 
Rwandaness. It not only emphasizes similarities 
and denounces difference but simultaneously 
calls upon Hutu individuals to apologize for the 
actions of their ancestors, something that will be 
described more in depth later in the paper. 
As nationality is emphasized, the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda program and other 
reconciliation efforts fail to support other 
intersections of Rwandans’ identities, the 
hundreds of other components that create 
unique experiences. Intersectionality is the 
study of the interconnected nature of all the 
components of identity and social categorization 
working together to create these experiences. 
These categories include (but are not limited to) 
race, class and gender and individuals can move 
between different categories and the boundaries 
of each category can adjust over time to include 
more or different individuals. Some parts of 
identity cannot be separated from others, 
creating a mutually inclusive experience. The 
Ndi Umunyarwanda program will be analyzed 
through 11 in-field interviews under the lens of 
intersectionality and mutual inclusivity to create 
a full understanding of different people’s 
experiences with the program and its overall 
effectiveness. 
 
Research Methodology: Existing literature, 
theories and insights from multiple disciplines 
evaluated individual experiences with the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda program. The main source of 
data comes from eleven in-field interviews 
which were conducted over three weeks in April 
and May of 2017. Eight interviews were done in 
Kigali, Rwanda and three in Butare, Rwanda. 
The interviewees consisted of local academics, 
political officials and general citizens. The three 
groups were chosen to gain perspective on the 
 
10 Victor Visathan, “‘Ndi Umunarwanda,’ 
concept should be a legacy for posterity,” New 
Times, March 26, 2015. 
way ethnicity was being taught, how it affected 
leaderships and how it was perceived at the 
citizen level. The individuals discussed identity 
politics in 30- to 120-minute informal, semi-
structured interviews. These individuals were 
interviewed on the basis of understanding what 
ethnicity meant to them on a personal or 
profession-based level and observed political 
and cultural implications of these identities. 
Eight of the interviews were conducted 
in English; three in Kinyarwanda. The interview 
in Kinyarwanda conducted in Butare, Rwanda 
was translated by a professor, Dr. Bernard 
Rutikanga while the two interviews conducted 
in Kigali were translated by a trilingual student, 
Margot Manuella. Interviewees gave permission 
to be recorded which were later transcribed and 
analyzed with ethnographic research methods 
and from a symbolic interactionist perspective. 
After demographic questions and relevant 
background information (as identified by the 
informant), the informant was asked to define 
how they understood the term “ethnicity.” 
Individuals answered with definitions, personal 
statements and historical recaps of the terms’ 
usage in Rwanda. Following, interview 
questions were taken from a prepared list. The 
informants had not seen the questions before the 
interview. Interviews were fluid and the 
informant directed the conversation with their 
answers. An example list of prepared questions 
is included in the appendix. 
Taboo’s surrounding the Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa identities were respected as these terms can 
be offensive or triggering to individuals. One’s 
ubwoko (kind, or again, in this context the Hutu, 
Tutsi or Twa categorization) affiliation was 
never assumed, guessed or questioned directly. 
Based on the subject of the interviews being 
ethnicity, it was often disclosed organically then 
attached to the respondent’s ideologies. 
30
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The two essential components in this 
study are ubwoko and post-genocide identities. 
The strength of Rwandan identity will be noted 
during the analysis of the interviews. Age is a 
variable that is only used to differentiate those 
alive during the genocide from those born after. 
Although class, political affiliation and 
occupation could correlate with one’s ubwoko 
and post- genocide identity, for simplification, 
these will not be evaluated. Gender is not 
addressed due to the lack of representation in 
the sample group. 
 
Limitations: Budget, time and travel all posed 
limitations. As an undergraduate student 
studying abroad, time was limited to two 
months of preparation, three weeks of 
interviewing and one month of in-country 
analysis. Positionality of the interviewer and the 
official government stance on this topic 
assuredly impacted responses. Ten of the 11 
interviewees were men and no one interviewed 
identified as Twa. Travel limitations only 
allowed for interviews in two cities in Rwanda: 
Kigali and Butare. Both cities played key roles 
in the conflict as violence initially erupted in 
Kigali and reports suggest the most extensive 
slaughter in Butare. In 1994 and at the time of 
the interviews, Kigali and Butare were the 
largest cities in Rwanda granting it’s citizens 
easier access to public resources, education and 
political supervision. 
Limitations are important to note to 
qualify potential response bias and the note the 
sample was not representative of all 
intersections. This research is the beginning to 
further research on experience with this 
program, as it is not expansive to all Rwandans. 
These limitations do not discredit this research 
because it only analyzes the intersections that 
 
11 Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak, 
Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory 
(Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2017), 93. 
are represented and do not discuss experiences 
based off of gender. Overall this research is 
credible within its scope. 
 
Interdisciplinarity: The evaluation of the 
individual experience with the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda in Rwanda satisfies all 
conditions calling for interdisciplinarity as 
outlined by Allen F. Repko and Rick Szostak: it 
is complex, requires two or more disciplines 
offering insights and works to explain an 
unresolved societal problem.11 
 For example, understanding the 
individual’s experience with the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda program is complex: including 
the concept of identity, intersectionality, 
defining and removing ubwoko, understanding 
the Ndi Umunyarwanda program and evaluating 
the words of Rwandans. Many disciplines are 
consulted to understand these complexities but 
the volume of literature on specific to the 
program is limited due to the program’s young 
age. Anthropological studies, historical 
explanations and political science 
rationalizations attempt to justify ideologies of 
the Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa identities but 
remains incomplete and contradictory, leaving 
the understanding of Rwandan identity 
unsolved. Written literature on the program is 
sparse and field interviews gather testimonies 
from genocidal experience more often than the 
post-genocide era.12 There is a hole in academic 
understanding that can be filled through this 
analysis. 
 
Complexities and Themes 
Identity, Intersectionality and Mutual 
Inclusivity: Identity is complex; it is composed 
of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, dis/ability, 
12 See Phillip Gourevitch, We wish to inform 
you that tomorrow we will be killed with our 
families: Stories from 
Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
1998). 
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age, religion, socioeconomic status, political 
affiliation, power domain, family status, 
occupation and more.13 Based in sociology, 
identity is socially constructed: a person cannot 
be separated from the people, historical events 
and social circumstances that surrounds them, 
particularly through socialization and the social 
groups within which one identifies. The 
plurality of social groups intersects, making 
unique circumstances for all individuals, the 
main premise of intersectionality. 
Intersectionality is a method of 
analyzing the immense complexities in human 
experience through axis of social division and 
complex discrimination.14 Different social 
belongings do not create identities that are 
“alternatives but combinations.”15 These layers 
of identity “operate not as discrete and mutually 
exclusive entities but build on each other and 
work together.”16 
The intersections of identity are cohesive 
facets to one’s being and experience. For 
example, a black woman can never disassociate 
between her gender and her race; every 
experience she has is a combination of the 
two— as black and as a woman.17 For this 
person, these two parts of identity are mutually 
inclusive. Mutual inclusivity relates to this 
 
13 David Newman, Sociology: Exploring the 
architecture of everyday life. (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 
2014). 
14 Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge, 
Intersectionality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2016). 
15 Caroline Andrew, “Multiculturalism, gender, 
and social cohesion: Reflections on 
intersectionality and urban citizenship in 
Canada.” In Insiders and outsiders: Alan Cairns 
and the reshaping of Canadian Citizenship, ed. 
Philip Resnick & Gerald Kernerman 
(Vancouver: U of British Columbia P, 2005), 
317. 
16 Collins and Bilge, Intersectionality 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 4. 
study: For example, a Hutu bystander can never 
have an experience as just a Hutu (ubwoko) or 
just a bystander (post-genocide identity), they 
will always be both and their lived experiences 
and ideologies will reflect that combination. 
Over time, boundaries of groups are 
dynamic: they eb and flow to include or exclude 
others, often through the constant developing 
and overlapping intersectional identities and 
shared experiences identities and shared 
experiences.18 The multiple dimensions and 
understandings of human experiences are 
unique to an individual and can also expand 
across a group of individuals who have the same 
or similar intersections and create dialogue 
between different intersections. In other cases, it 
can cause mistrust, blame and stagnation.19 
In the context of Rwanda, “‘Hutu’ and 
‘Tutsi’ are ancient terms with changing 
meanings; terms that diachronically (across 
time) evolve and synchronically (at a point in 
time) polyvalent.”20 The two essential 
components of identity for this study are 
ubwoko and post-genocide identities, which 
over time have flowed into overlapping and 
mutual inclusive duos. 
 
17 Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the margins: 
Intersectionality, identity politics, and violence 
against women of color,” Stanford Law Review 
43, no. 6 (July 1991): 1241-1299. 
18 Fredrik Barth, “Introduction,” in Ethnic 
Groups and Boundaries, ed. Fredrik Barth 
(Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1969). 
19 Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and 
Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide 
in Rwanda." Peace Review 15, no., 3 (2003): 
287-94. 
20 Andrea Purdeková, ““Building a nation in 
Rwanda? De-ethnicisation and its discontents,” 
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 8 no. 3 
(December 2008): 512. 
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Ubwoko: Ubwoko is pertinent to identity and 
references Hutu, Tutsi and Twa categorization.21 
The Abahutu, Abatutsi and Abatwa were 
historically perceived to be widely different 
from one another.22 These “differences” were 
exacerbated by colonial rule and shaped 
individual experience, determining the fate of 
their descendants. 
As once a distinction of profession and 
wealth—the Abatutsi were wealthy pastoralists, 
the Abatwa poor forest dwellers and the 
Abahutu were agriculturalists somewhere in 
between—ubwoko evolved to being much 
more.23 Observed differences between these 
groups were well recorded and diverse, 
including height, weight, nose size, skin color, 
lactose in/tolerance and more.24 
Before colonization, amoko was 
associated with one’s clan.25 During and after, 
the term became synonymous to the Abahutu, 
Abatutsi and Abatwa categorization.26 Ubwoko 
is translated as ethnicity, genre, tribe and type, 
but the most authentic translation from 
Kinyarwanda to English is “kind.” Every noun 
in Kinyarwanda has a “kind,” as described by 
Informant IX in an interview conducted by the 
author in Kigali on May 3, 2017: 
 
Ethnicity, if you try to put it into 
Kinyarwanda, it is called ubwoko. And 
everything, it has ubwoko – even 
 
21 Lee Ann Fujii, Killing neighbors: Webs of 
violence in Rwanda (Ithica: Cornell University 
Press, 2009). 
22 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; 
Newbury, “Ethnicity”; Purdeková, ““Building,”; 
Straub, Pearlman and Miller, “Healing the roots 
of genocide in Rwanda”; Vansina, “The 
politics,” 37-44. 
23 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; 
Amini Jean de Dieu Ngabonziza, “The 
Importance of Language 
Studies in Conflict Resolution.” Journal of 
African Conflicts and Peace Studies 2, no. 1 
(September 2013). White, “An African,” 40-46. 
animals, computers – when you try to 
translate ubwoko into English, the 
meaning is not ethnicity, it is kind . . . 
This pen has ubwoko, this computer has 
ubwoko, this guy has ubwoko. It is 
confusing, it could mean different 
things. 
 
Informant IX continues to discuss the confusion 
that began when Rwanda was colonized: 
But when the colonials came here, they 
brought ethnicity with its meaning of 
same culture, same background but here 
it was different…It was one people with 
one culture, we speak the same 
language. It means that, if we take the 
real meaning of ethnicity, our ethnic 
group should be Rwandanism – not Hutu 
and Tutsi. But people confused “kind” 
and “ethnicity.” We used to say we have 
three groups, which is based on the truth. 
[Three ethnicities are not based on 
truth.] But genocide happened because 
of this confusion of ethnicities. 
 
As described by Informant IX, 
colonizing Belgians noticed differences and 
labeled Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as ethnic groups. 
The Westernized concept of ethnicity was 
directly applied to these groups.27 
Differentiating one’s “kind” as one’s “ethnicity” 
24 See Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers; 
Dean White, “An African Holocaust,” History 
Today 64, no. 6 (June 2014): 40-46; Aimable 
Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, 
Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 
2003). 
25 Ubwoko, singular, means “kind;” amoko, 
plural, means “kinds.” 
26 Fujii, Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in 
Rwanda. 
27 Wielenga, “‘Lived,’” 122-136. 
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brought different implications to Rwandans: An 
ethnic group consists of people who share 
human behavior and culture. This gives 
members a sense of belonging to the ethnic 
group through shared practices, traditions and 
rituals.28 Far and wide, ethnicity is described as 
a common culture, language, region, values and 
beliefs.29 This definition was confirmed as a 
belief by multiple informants, specifically 
Informant V, interviewed by the author in 
Kigali on April 26, 2017: “Ethnicity is, I 
consider, as beliefs, cultures and perspectives 
that define a certain section of people. That 
brings them together and determines who the 
people of that section are and their origins.” 
When asked, however, how this applies 
to the differences between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
categorizations, the vital notions of “ethnicity” 
and “ubwoko” were lost in translation. It was 
quickly denounced by Informant X, interviewed 
in Kigali on May 3, 2017, that Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa were ethnically different: 
 
No. Absolutely no. I think that here, the 
context of Rwanda does not have this 
ethnicity. How would you define people 
that are speaking one language, they 
don’t have a second language, they have 
one culture, they have one 
leadership? … How would you explain 
to me that, you know? … But in 
Rwanda, [different ethnicities?] No way. 
No way!30 
 
The argument proposed by informants is 
confirmed in existing literature.31 Despite these 
 
28  Barth, “Introduction.” 
29 White, “An African,” 40-46.; Wielenga, 
“‘Lived,’” 122-136; Straub, Pearlman and 
Miller, “Healing the roots of genocide in 
Rwanda”; Mamdani, When Victims Become 
Killers. 
30 Informant X, interview by author, Kigali, 
Rwanda, May 3, 2017. 
31 See White, “An African,” 40-46; 
Twagilimana, The Debris of Ham. 
arguments, it must be stated: “ethnic diversity is 
socially articulated and maintained.”32 Belgians 
imposed their concept of ethnicity onto 
Rwandan culture and emphasized social 
difference between the “kinds.” After 
independence, the Rwandan government 
maintained the groups as ethnicities. The social 
hierarchy was cemented and maintaining this 
“ethnic diversity” served as the path of least 
resistance for society’s continuation.33 
Barth emphasizes ethnicity is not 
concrete categorization based on promordial 
blood lines, but is dynamic human collection 
seen as “a population which … has a 
membership which identifies itself, and is 
identified by others, as constituting a category 
distinguishable from other categories of the 
same order.”34 Hutu, Tutsi and Twa fell into this 
definition: the populations identified themselves 
and could identify others, and were 
distinguishable through physical appearance, 
economic status or association.   
32 Harald Eidheim, “When ethnic identity is a 
social stigma,” in Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries, ed. Fredrik Barth 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 
39. 
33 Eidheim, “When ethnic,” 39; see White, “An 
African,” 40-46; Mamdani, When Victims 
Become Killers; Fujii, 
Killing neighbors: Webs of violence in Rwanda. 
34   Barth, “Introduction,” 11. 
Figure 1: Post-Genocide Identities 
Term Definition Ubwoko Affiliation 
survivor any Tutsi who survived Tutsi 
 












Rescuer individual who helped Abatutsi survive 
Hutu, 
sometimes Twa 
not born those born after July 1, 1994 Rwandan 
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Though, the non-social or economic 
status distinguishable traits were the ones 
exacerbated and misinformed by colonial rule. 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were reified from a fluid 
categorization of class to biological differences 
based on physical generalizations which 
resulted in a socially constructed division 
deemed “ethnic.” Falsely using the term 
“ethnicity” allowed colonists to skirt 
responsibility for the division, while 
successfully executing their “divide and rule” 
methodology to gain control of a population that 
was once in, at the very least, peaceful 
coexistence. 
Regardless of the ethnicity debate, Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa identities are significant to the 
history of Rwanda and to individual experience. 
Therefore, the term ubwoko alleviates confusion 
with definitions of ethnicity and best highlights 
the differences between the groups without 
imposing Western ideologies or emphasizing 
misinterpreted values.35 Ubwoko allows a more 
honest evaluation of their current implications, 
especially in relation to lived experiences with 
Ndi Umunyarwanda, a program that seeks 
unification through the erasure of the Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa identities. 
 
Post-Genocide Identities: Another sect of 
Rwandan identity are post-genocide identities. 
There are six post-genocide identities used 
based on informants: survivors, perpetrator, 
bystander, refugee, rescuer and those not born. 
Identities were prescribed to individuals based 
upon involvement in the Genocide against the 
Tutsi. They are outlined in Figure 1: Post-
Genocide Identities. 
 
35 Sigrun Marie Moss, “Beyond Conflict and 
Spoilt Identities: How Rwandan Leaders Justify 
a Single Recategorization Model for Post-
Conflict Reconciliation,” in Journal of Social 
and Political Psychology 2, no. 1 (2014): 435–
449; Moss and Vollhardt, “‘You Can’t.” 
The categories are defined as follows: A 
survivor survived the genocide; to officially be 
recognized by the Rwandan government as a 
survivor, the individual can only be Tutsi (not 
Hutu or Twa). A perpetrator committed acts of 
genocide (ideation, vandalism, rape, murder, 
etc.). Bystanders were not victims nor added or 
prevented the victimization of Abatutsi. 
Refugees fled Rwanda during the official 
beginning of the conflict in 1959 through the 
end of the genocide in 1994. A rescuer saved 
Abatutsi victims. Finally, those who were 
categorized as unborn were born after July 1, 
1994. 
The affiliation of post-genocide 
identities with historic ubwoko create 
complexities (see final column in Figure 1: 
Post-Genocide Identities). Ubwoko is prohibited 
from applications for education, government 
office or employment. In contrast, post-
genocide identities are not forbidden and can 
actually grant or deny access to certain 
resources like health care and welfare for 
survivors.36 While Abatutsi/survivors are 
receiving healthcare benefits, all Abahutu are 
presumed to have been perpetrators.37 Ubwoko 
was eliminated from government discourse to 
avoid inequalities and stigmatization but post-
genocide identities creates different treatment 
and are directly aligned with ubwoko. 
Between individuals in modern-day 
Rwanda “[all] parties try to behave as if 
ethnicity ‘does not count.’”38 Despite their 
behavior, “[Rwandans] caution that ethnicity is 
as present as ever in Rwanda. They believe that 
if Rwandans do not use the words ‘Tutsi’ and 
‘Hutu,’ it is because they have found other ways 
of saying them.”39 Another way to say them in 
36 “Health and Social Welfare,” Republic of 
Rwanda, accessed April 14, 2018, 
http://gov.rw/about-the- government/health-and-
social-welfare/ 
37 See Eidheim, “When ethnic.” 
38 Eidheim, “When ethnic,” 54. 
39 Mbaraga, “State pushes.” 
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through these post-genocide identities which 
follow ubwoko lines consistently. 
These intersections of identity create 
multiple lenses of experience with the Ndi 
Umunyarwanda program. The complexities 
discussed in this section are pertinent to the 
unique experiences Rwandans have had with the 
program. 
 
Understanding the Ndi Umunyarwanda 
program’s situation: The understanding of the 
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was synthesized 
from multiple sources. There is no official 
English version describing the program and 
literature surrounding the topic is limited.  
Ndi Umunyarwanda was conceived at a 
Youth Connekt event in 2013 and officially 
launched and adopted as a national campaign by 
the National Unity of Reconciliation Committee 
(NURC) within months.40 and under it, 
President Kagame “called for young adults of 
Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide 
committed ‘in their name’ by their parents and 
relatives.”41 
According to the NURC, the program is 
described as follows: 
 
“[Ndi Umunyarwanda ] provides a 
forum or space for Rwandans in 
various social groups to discuss issues 
related to national unity, reconciliation 
 
40 Robert Mbaraga, “State pushes campaign that 







41 Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, 
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44. 
42 Republic of Rwanda, “The National Policy on 
Unity and Reconciliation,” 112. 
and development. The program 
encompasses both the atrocities of the 
divisive past and the hope for a 
peaceful, reconciled and reunited 
country. Not all Rwandans need settle 
on a single interpretation, but the task 
is to work toward mutually acceptable 
accommodation. Ndi Umunyarwanda 
program is such a normative shift. By 
focusing on a shared citizenship – 
citizenship as a shared fate – the 
program restores the bond and 
solidarity between Rwandans.”42 
 
The program, as described above, 
encapsulates much of the public knowledge 
known about this program. As commented on 
by other scholars, details and descriptions of the 
program are scarce. Information translated into 
English is nearly nonexistent. 43 
The information that we have, however, 
can be discussed more in depth. First and 
foremost, the program calls “for young adults of 
Hutu descent to apologise for acts of genocide 
committed ‘in their name’ by their parents and 
relatives” which perpetuates a culture of 
apology established with the modernized 
Gacaca Courts, as previously discussed. 44 Since 
Hutu perpetrators were in the spotlight of these 
events, they did not have the analytical freedom 
43 See Catharine Newbury, “Ethnicity and the 
politics of history in Rwanda.” Africa Today 45, 
no. 1 (Jan. – Mar. 1998); Jan Vansina, “The 
politics of history and the crisis in the Great 
Lakes,” Africa Today 45, no. 1 (March 1998): 
37-44.; “Geography,” Republic of Rwanda, last 
modified 2017, http://gov.rw/home/geography/; 
Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, 
“Becoming Rwandan?” 
44 Callixte Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts, 
Reconciliation and the Politics of Apology in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda," South African Journal 
of Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2017): 44. 
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to understand the contents of the programs and 
were only expected to confess and apologize.  
Furthermore, although the program 
called for a forum for Rwandans to establish an 
agreed upon history and speak openly about the 
problems that have resulted from it, details of 
how the Ndi Umunyarwanda program is 
executed is vague.45 The implementation of this 
nation-building encourages discussion and “a 
deep, ‘experiential’ understanding” for their 
participants of the past and their re-socialized 
identities.”46 However, through conversations it 
appears that the program is concretely built 
around “a series of messages drawn up by the 
NURC and communicated in the context of 
other programmes…[and] also within the 
compulsory public meetings that take place at 
village level. These descriptions portray this 
communication as less a dialogue than a top-
down lesson on what it is to be Rwandan 
today.”47 
The top-down dialogue works to make 
“people believe a story of the past they are not 
allowed to contribute to.”48 The messaging 
within this story establishes “a shared moral 
atrocity of members of the Hutu community,” 
 
45 Mbaraga, “State pushes.” 
46 Ervin Straub, Laurie Anne Pearlman and 
Vachel Miller, “Healing the roots of genocide in 
Rwanda,” Peace 
Review 15, no. 3 (2003): 290. 
47 Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, 
“Becoming Rwandan?” 4. 
48 Purdeková, ““Building,”; 512. 
49 Kavuro, “Gacaca Courts,” 44. 
50 Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, 
“Becoming Rwandan?” 1. 
51 Cori Wielenga, “‘Lived’ Identities in 
Rwanda: Beyond Ethnicity?” African Insight, 
44, no. 1 (June 2014): 122- 
136; Kavuro, "Gacaca Courts,” 44. 
52 Rwandan Government. Executive Summary: 
Ndi Umunyarwanda Evaluation, 2017. 
53 Edmund Kagire, “Initiators, officials defend 
genocide forgiveness campaign,” The East 
furthering othering and villianizing the Hutu 
perpetrators.49  
Ironically, with its emphasis on Hutu 
accountability, another of its objectives was to 
emphasize Rwandan identity over everything 
else and remove the use of one’s ubwoko in the 
official, public sphere. “If ethnic hatred was to 
be overcome and further violence prevented, it 
was necessary to replace ethnic division with 
something else.”50 Through national unity, the 
program worked to shift belonging from 
ubwoko to national identity and centered around 
“Rwanda’s moral values and Rwandan spirit” 
and “the replac[ement] of ethnic identity with 
civic identity.”51 An Executive Summary 
sponsored by the Rwandan government states 
that the program “is perceived as an effective 
mechanism to rehabilitate Rwandanity.”52 
However, many scholars beg to differ. 
This program’s legitimacy is “highly 
criticized” and questioned by many Western 
scholars and other populations.53 It is said to be 
built on fabricated unity that minimizes 
differences between Rwandans and “the 
emphasis on national unity has been used as a 
tool by the RPF-based elite for entrenching their 





M., 2013; Romeo Rugero, “Hutu Manifesto 




Ingelaere, “The ruler’s drum and the people’s 
shout: Accountability and representation on 
Rwanda’s hills,” in Remaking Rwanda: State 
building and human rights after mass violence, 
ed. Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf (Madison, 
WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2011) 
67-78. 
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power… silencing opposition voices in the 
name of national unity.”54 Sigrun Marie Moss 
claims intersectional differences are ignored as 
“the Rwandan government’s recategorization 
policy involves (psychologically) dissolving the 
subordinate groups rather than improving 
relations between those groups.”55 
The psychological dissolve of these 
groups, however, only happens in the public 
sphere. The efforts of deemphasizing ubwoko 
has rather shifted emphasis, making it taboo to 
speak about in public but the conversations 
continue in private and only within like-minded 
circles, stagnating growth and perpetuating 
othering. In the effort to impose unity, this 
programs and others that complement it have 
actually made ubwoko more salient while 
simultaneously “driving it underground.”56 
 
54 Janine Natalya Clark, “National unity and 
reconciliation in Rwanda: A flawed approach?” 
Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 28, no. 2 (May 
2010); Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf, 
“Introduction: Seeing like a post-conflict state,” 
in Remaking Rwanda: State building and human 
rights after mass violence, ed. Scott Straus and 
Lars Waldorf (Madison, WI: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2011); Communauté des 
Potiers du Rwanda, “Becoming Rwandan?” 1. 
55 Sigrun Marie Moss, and Johanna Ray 
Vollhardt, “‘You Can’t Give a Syringe with 
Unity’: Rwandan Responses to the 
Government’s Single Recategorization 
The program is praised by the Rwandan 
government, survivors seeking peace, 
perpetrators pursuing acceptance and those born 
after genocide fighting for reconciliation. An 
example of this praise can be seen through a 
statement by Hon. Stanislas Kamanzi: 
[The] Ndi Umunyarwanda program 
helps us to fight against anyone and 
anything that may want to take us back. 
It helps us to understand that being 
Rwandan doesn’t mean having the 
Rwandan nationality but being proud of 
the Rwandan identity and committed to 
work hard for the development of your 
Country.57 
Results and Analysis: 
The 11 informants represented six 
intersections of ubwoko and post-genocide 
identities (see Figure 2: Informant 
Intersections.58) Informant VIII did not disclose 
either intersect, therefore is categorized as 
“unknown.” The categories include: Tutsi 
survivor, Hutu perpetrator, Hutu bystander, 
Tutsi refugee, Hutu rescuer and Rwandan born 
post- genocide. All informants identified as 
Rwandan, but emphasis differed along the 
ubwoko divisions. For example, refugee 
Informants V, X and XI and survivors III and 
VII identified as Rwandans but unashamedly 
Policies,” in Analyses of Social Issues and 
Public Policy 16, no. 1 
(November 2015): 436. 
56 Communauté des Potiers du Rwanda, 
“Becoming Rwandan?” 1. 
57 “REMA staff members in a dialogue about 
‘Ndi Umunyarwanda’ Program,” Press Room, 
Rwanda Environment 
Management Authority (REMA), last modified 





58 See Appendix A: Demographics of Informants 
for details on each informant. 
Figure 2: 
Informant Intersections 
Tutsi survivor III, VII 
Hutu perpetrator IV, VI 
Hutu bystander IX 
Tutsi refugee V, X, XI 
Hutu rescuer I 
unborn Rwandan II 
unknown    VIII 
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identified as Abatutsi. Informants IV, VI and IX 
self-identified as historically Hutu but 
passionately proclaimed themselves now as 
Rwandans. They all were eager to discuss how 
all people in Rwanda are Rwandans and did not 
spend time discussing individual ubwoko, 
emphasizing that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were 
gone. 
The interviews were grouped by the 
informants’ intersection of ubwoko and post-
genocide identity and analyzed. To see more 
context regarding each informant including age, 
sex and occupation, please see Appendix A: 
Demographic of Informants. 
 
Tutsi Survivor: Two informants – 
Informant III and VII – identified as male, Tutsi 
survivors over 50 years of age. Informant III 
discussed his experience as an academic and 
Informant VII shared his personal experiences. 
Informant III immediately stated that 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are not different 
ethnicities: “They would be best described as 
social classes or occupations… The differences 
were created: colonization. The differences 
which had to do with stereotyping of behavior… 
by the Belgians.”59 According to Informant VII, 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are subcultures within the 
Rwandan culture. Both informants expressed 
stigmatized views of the Abatwa. 
Informant VII believes ubwoko 
identification is dying but not dead. He 
discussed the stigma and meanings of ubwoko in 
modern Rwanda: 
It doesn’t mean much really; 
some people still cling to it. 
They’d like to see that they 
are identified by them. But it 
has a meaning in the sense 
that if I say I am a Tutsi at 
least I know nobody is 
 
59 Informant III, interview by author. Butare, 
Rwanda. April 25, 2017. 
60 Informant VII, interview by author. Kigali, 
Rwanda. April 27, 2017. 
going to doubt my 
cleanliness as far as the 
genocide is concerned. If I 
say I am a Hutu people will 
start saying, ‘oh what were 
you doing back in the 
genocide, were you part of 
it?’ It still has that kind of 
stain and stigma on 
[amoko].60 
 
In contrast, Informant III states: “no 
body today would be harassed or 
discriminated against because of what he 
is.”61 Instead the government provided each 
Rwandan what they need: the Twa received 
support (Informant III compared it to 
Affirmative Action), survivors got medical 
care and new homes, and perpetrators were 
reeducated to fight genocide ideology. 
Overall, the two informants felt 
encouraged by the conversation on ubwoko. 
According to Informant VII, “[Being 
Rwandese] has always been my dream, to 
sit in a country where I’m still aware of 
who I am but at least I know it doesn’t 
come with consequences. So, being a Tutsi, 
if I go somewhere and someone say, ‘are 
you Hutu or are you Tutsi,’ I can say ‘it 
doesn’t matter!’”62 
Informant VII spoke well on the 
program: “I have always spoken about [Ndi 
Umunyarwanda] because that is the 
attempt, we are creating to evaluate the past 
and see the wrongs and the evils of 
ethnicity and replace them with Ndi 
Umunyarwanda.”63 Informant III believes 
the Ndi Umunyarwanda teachings are to 
put favoritism and discrimination in 
Rwanda’s past. Academic Informant III 
saw the older generation with an attachment 
61 Informant III, interview. 
62 Informant VII, interview. 
63 Informant VII, interview. 
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to ubwoko that is difficult to fight against, 
but the program is being accepted by the 
younger generation. 
Informant III and VII believed 
ubwoko ideology is not dead and will not 
die for a few generations. Claims stating 
unification of all Rwandans are false in the 
eyes of Tutsi survivors but through 
programs like Ndi Umunyarwanda, 
Rwandans are fighting this ideology. 
Ubwoko should be downplayed but cannot 
die, because as Informant VII pointed out, 
the name of the genocide keeps Abatutsi, 
Abahutu and Abatwa alive. 
 
Hutu Perpetrator: Informant IV and VI 
identified as Hutu perpetrators. Both informants 
were agriculturalists over the age of 50. 
Informant IV was a female and Informant VI 
was a male. They both participated in TIG 
(Travail d’Intérêt Général, French; “works of 
general service”), a reconstructive alternative to 
prison that focused on unlearning hate and 
rebuilding the communities destroyed during 
genocide. The interviews were translated from 
Kinyarwanda. 
Both informants clung to their Hutu 
identity in the past, but each felt it was 
“impossible” to find Abahutu, Abatutsi and 
Abatwa in Rwanda today; everyone in Rwanda 
are Rwandese. It was evident that the 
reeducation within TIG created this shift in 
ubwoko ideology: “Today, a Tutsi is a friend to 
[a Hutu] – he can go and share everything with 
him…There are no differences…Everyone 
today is in the same line – they are Rwandese. 
They are walking together in daily life…We 
don’t feel anything now, we are free from these 
labels,” said Informant VI.64 Informant VI saw 
TIG as a calling for forgiveness across Rwanda. 
In TIG, Informant IV learned that, “We have to 
 
64 Informant VI, interview by author, translated 
by Margot Manuella. Kigali, Rwanda. April 27, 
2017. 
avoid [bad ideology] and they teach us how to 
create friendships between everyone. And to 
make sure to talk to people with that bad 
[ideology]. Our country has been living on a bad 
past, but we are all the same… we need to make 
sure everyone is Ndi Umunyarwanda—no Hutu, 
no Tutsi, no anything else.”65 
The two Hutu perpetrators believed the 
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was good and so 
was the governance promoting it. 
 
Hutu Bystander: Informant IX was the only 
Hutu bystander interviewed. His experience was 
unique because he was involved in the creation 
of the Ndi Umunyarwanda program in 2014. He 
was 30-50 years old, a male and a member of 
the Rwandan Parliament. He identified as Hutu 
before genocide because that is what his parents 
told him he was but gave no explanation. 
Today, he identified as Rwandan and fights the 
ubwoko ideology: 
 
My kids will know that my wife is a 
Tutsi by background and I am a Hutu 
by background and they will know 
what it meant in the past…they will 
know that the foundation of our 
marriage was on Rwandanism… 
They were born because we broke this 
bridge [between Hutu and Tutsi]… 
So, these kids will not be Hutu, they 
will not be Tutsi, they will be real 
Rwandans: that is what I breed.66 
 
Informant IX’s intention of the program was to 
take the blame off young people for what their 
previous generation had done. The program was 
meant to create a platform to move on together 
with one identity. He elaborated: 
 
The younger generation will not 
understand that they have a 
65 Informant VI, interview. 
66 Informant IX. Interview by author. Personal 
interview. Kigali, May 3, 2017. 
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responsibility of rebuilding this nation 
when they are not together. If they are 
pointing fingers to some young people 
saying, “your parents destroyed the 
company, come rebuild it,” “your 
parents killed us, now come rebuild 
[the country].” No… They have to 
fight for the good for this country 
together.67 
 
Informant IX emphasized that Rwanda was in a 
transitional period and Ndi Umunyarwanda aided 
in the transition. According to him, the only 
negative aspect was that more people were not 
adopting the ideology. The genocide happened 
because of the negative ideology, and Informant 
IX did his part to make sure it does not reoccur. 
 
Tutsi Refugee: Informants V, X and XI identified 
as Tutsi refugees. Each spent time in Uganda but 
Informant XI lived in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and the United Kingdom before 
returning to Rwanda as an advisor to President 
Kagame in 2002. Informant V and X both worked 
in the civil society promoting peace and 
reconciliation. All three informants were men and 
Informant V was 18-30 years old; Informant X 
was 30-50 years old; and Informant XI was over 
50 years of age. 
Although outside of Rwanda, the three 
informants identified as Rwandans they 
nonetheless subscribed to the concept ubwoko. In 
Uganda, their ubwoko was not as important as 
where they came from, Rwanda. The Tutsi 
refugees found strength in the Ndi Umunyarwanda 
program because it aligned with how they had 
identified their entire lives. They felt they were 
better off identifying as Rwandan and felt that 
others will gain from it parting with their amoko as 
well. 
Informant X believed individuals only 
used ubwoko identities when it was beneficial for 
 
67 Informant IX, interview. 
68 Informant X, interview by author. Kigali, 
Rwanda. May 3, 2017. 
them, but he believed the Rwandan identity was 
always beneficial. 
The benefits from one using amoko in the 
public sphere is what the government tried to 
prevent through this program. As explained by 
Informant X: 
 
The government is saying, feel free to 
belong to any group that you want. Feel 
free to say that you are a Hutu, a Tutsi, or 
you are a Twa, but you should not, you 
should not use those for any political ends 
or economic [means]… I would obviously 
say that I am a Tutsi, but I don’t think that 
means much to me in Rwanda today. 
Because I have no advantages or benefits 
that accrue from the fact that I am a 
Tutsi.68 
 
Informant X believes the program “is the 
right way to go” and all criticism on the program is 
a “baseless” form of genocide ideology. He 
continued: “Really to me, being a Hutu or a Tutsi 
or a Twa, it doesn’t bring the bread on the table. 
But being a Rwandan helps you to understand 
your level of one, patriotism, love, compassion, all 
of those strong values, human values that are 
needed for a day-to-day life.”69 
The Tutsi refugees were optimistic 
regarding the program. Informant V said it best: 
“My optimism is that a time will come when the 
right will overcome the wrong. We are all 
Rwandese, not by mistake or pressure but by 
origin… This ethnicity is what brings people 
together. This is what makes people one.”70 
 
Hutu Resuer: Informant I was a Hutu rescuer. He 
claimed that the identification of Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa were never the problem, instead it was how 
amoko were politically manipulated by the 
colonialists. He identified as Rwandan but sees 
segregated social groups: 
69 Informant X, interview. 
70 Informant V, interview by author, Kigali, 
Rwanda, April 26, 2017. 
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Up to today, we haven’t managed to 
fight against ethnicity in the sense that 
when it comes to things like wedding 
invitations…the wedding of the Twa is 
99% Twa. And it is the same for the 
Hutu, the wedding of the Tutsis, still the 
same. Politically, everyone will go to 
school and have all these rights. But still 
there is still this idea of associating and 
inviting and knowing each other.71 
 
Before genocide, Informant I knew his 
family categorized as Hutu. “The way I was 
brought up, I was above [identifying by 
ubwoko]. I associated with the Hutus and the 
Tutsis without feeling proud of being a Hutu or 
undermining the Tutsis.”72Today, his identity is 
Rwandan but struggles with his post-genocide 
category as he is ostracized as a traitor by 
Abahutu and distrusted by survivors. 
Regarding the Ndi Umunyarwanda 
program, Informant I stated: “I believe this Ndi 
Umunyarwanda is beneficial, especially to the 
young. Had it been taught before genocide and the 
government focused on teaching on Rwandaness 
then the genocide would not have been there.” He 
firmly believes, however, the directives for the 
program come from the bottom, down and “[The 
government] injects the spirit of being Rwandan 
into the community.”73 
Informant I saw ubwoko as a spreading 
virus that must be stopped. 
 
Unborn Rwandan: Informant II, a university 
student born after the genocide, did not identify 
with ubwoko categories. He stated there is no need 
for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities and it was not 
used: “No, there is no way that anyone can be 
referred to by the school or the church by the 
 
71 Informant I, interview by author, translated by 
Bernard Rutikanda. Butare, Rwanda. April 25, 
2017. 
72 Informant I, interview. 
73 Informant I, interview. 
identities. It may be for people who still have 
genocide ideology, they may teach their children. 
But properly, there is not.”74 
Informant II believed Hutu, Tutsi and Twa 
were all Rwandan based on culture, language and 
geographical location. He did, however, claim that 
he saw a generational difference between those 
who held ubwoko ideology. Informant II identified 
with the Ndi Umunyarwanda program for many 
reasons, but especially that it was a place to learn 
from those directing the conversation: “If someone 
has a misunderstanding you have the chance to 
give him the proper understanding [with Ndi 
Umunyarwanda] and get him to the right speed.”75 
He suggested expansion of the program to 
communities, beyond academia. 
“[The conversation on ethnicity] can’t ever 
be bad. It is always good.”76 
 
Unknown: Informant VIII did not associate with 
ubwoko or post-genocide identities during the 
interview. He was the chief executive officer of the 
Rwandan Governance Board, in the 30–50 age 
category and identified as Rwandan. He was 
previously a professor who taught political 
science. 
Informant VIII was aware of negating criticism but 
responded differently than other informants. He 
said: 
 
Negating ethnicity is a good thing…When 
you look at it from outside, sometimes you 
don’t feel the pain that people have 
experienced being prisoners of those 
identities…we have been prisoners of 
Hutu, Tutsi identities, I don’t think we 
have got anything good out of it… the only 
thing we have gotten is just genocide? So, 
74 Informant II, interview by author. Butare, 
Rwanda. April 25, 2017. 
75 Informant II, interview. 
76 Informant II, interview. 
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deterring it for me is not a bad thing…we 
survived [those identities].77 
 
To informant VIII, Ndi Umunyarwanda 
represented similarities in Rwandan culture and 
the aspiration for all Rwandans to be united. He 
believed in the power of the program. He only 
spoke of his professional experience with the 
program. 
 
Further Analysis: Ultimately, informants in all 
intersections identified as Rwandan and that 
ubwoko has no value in the modern context. Hutu 
perpetrators, unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders 
and the unknown informant claimed that Abahutu, 
Abatusi and Abatwa do not exist in Rwanda today, 
directly conflicting with the views held by Tutsi 
survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers. 
Similarly, all Rwandans interviewed believed the 
Ndi Umunyarwanda program was effective, but 
the same split occurred when asked the downfalls 
of the program. The Hutu perpetrators, unborn 
Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the unknown 
informant saw no flaws in the program. The Tutsi 
survivors, Tutsi refugees and Hutu rescuers 
critiqued its implementation. 
In both instances, Hutu perpetrators, 
unborn Rwandans, Hutu bystanders and the 
unknown informant all favored Rwandan 
government ideologies. The Tutsi survivors, Tutsi 
refugees and Hutu rescuers spoke freely of their 
experiences and observations. The observation 
creates two categories, splitting the Abahutu. The 
once unified and shared-experienced Abahutu 
have diachronically split, part staying together and 
the other part presently moving toward the 
Abatutsi experience. Ubwoko experience shifted, 
putting more emphasis on the mutually inclusive 
ubwoko/post-genocide intersect, creating mistrust, 
 
77 Informant VIII, interview by author. Kigali, 
Rwanda. May 3, 2017. 
78 Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, and 
Vachel Miller. "Healing the Roots of Genocide 
blame and stagnation and a newly maintained 
group boundary.78 
The second group (Hutu perpetrators, 
unborn Rwandans and Hutu bystanders) fall into a 
more vulnerable subsection of society—Hutu 
perpetrators feel they must repay society for their 
actions, Hutu bystanders the same but for not 
stopping genocide, unborn Rwandans are young 
and malleable—and shared similar ideologies. 
Through knowledge of historical cultural 
expectations of obedience and social conditioning 
of authoritative acceptance, it was perceived that 
these groups were did not critically dissected 
government ideologies before accepting them, 
including the Ndi Umunyarwanda program. The 
reason for this is unknown based off of the data. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The rhetoric of the program was 
emphasized to perpetrators and Rwandans born 
after the genocide. The informants who expressed 
Ndi Umunyarwanda teachings most verbatim were 
Informants II, IV and VI: those falling in the 
unborn Rwandan and Abahutu perpetrator 
categories. Although most skepticism came from 
Informant I, all eleven informants agreed Ndi 
Umunyarwanda ideology was a strong form of 
reconciliation. 
 
In conclusion, individuals live through 
their Rwandan and mutually inclusive post-
genocide and ubwoko identities differently. This 
has resulted in varying experiences and reactions 
to the Ndi Umunyarwanda program. Some 
believed the program to be perfect, curated by the 
people for the people. Others felt the ideology was 
a directive from the top down and injected into the 
population.  
The findings emphasized the mutually 
inclusive experiences of ubwoko and post-
genocide identities while uncovering a shift of 
in Rwanda." Peace Review 15, no., 3 (2003): 
287-94. 
43
et al.: The Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship Volume III Issue
Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2020
 Fairfield University | Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship | Spring 2020 
 
44 
shared experiences and a dissolving group 
boundary around those who historically identified 
as Hutu. This could all be strengthened by a larger 
and more well-rounded sample of informants. My 
recommendation would be to follow this study 
with a greater volume of interviews that includes 
more women, Twa representation and a more 
robust span of ages and geographical residences. 
The Ndi Umunyarwanda program was 
seen as essential reconciliation process to political 
leaders. However, these leaders did not consider or 
cater to all intersections and experiences of 
Rwandans before implementation. The top-down, 
authoritative approach intimidates Rwanda’s 
democracy instead of allowing for grass roots 
participation of citizens to create the conversation 
and come to a deeper understanding amongst 
themselves. This deeper understand could have the 
potential for deeply rooted and authentic 
peacefulness. If the program made changes to 
increase participation, it has the potential to serve 
all Rwandans equally “in such a way that people 
can be free to ‘live out’ their ethnic identity” in any 
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Appendix A: Demographic of Informants 
1Interview translated to English from Kinyarwanda. 2This informant     did not 
state his ethnic background and he was born 
post-genocide. 3This informant did not state his ethnic background or his status 
during genocide. 
 








 Age Sex Occupation Category Intersection Date of Interview 
I1 50+ Male Agriculture Personal Hutu//Rescuer 25 April 2017 
II 18-30 Male Student Personal 2 25 April 2017 
III 50+ Male Professor Academia Tutsi//Refugee 25 April 2017 
IV1 50+ Female Agriculture Personal Hutu//Perpetrator 26 April 2017 
V 18-30 Male Civil Society Personal Tutsi//Refugee 26 April 2017 
VI1 50+ Male Agriculture Personal Hutu//Perpetrator 27 April 2017 
VII 50+ Male Pastor of Anglican Church Personal Tutsi//Survivor 27 April 2017 
VIII 30-50 Male CEO of RGB Political 3 2 May 2017 
IX 30-50 Male Member of Parliament Political Hutu//Bystander 3 May 2017 
X 30-50 Male Civil Society Personal Tutsi//Refugee 3 May 2017 
XI 50+ Male Presidential Advisor Political Tutsi//Refugee 9 May 2017 
Beginning each interview was a summary of the study with research intensions and researcher information. After age, 
occupation, and informant-identified background information was asked for. 
1.  Understand the definition of ethnicity from the perspective of individual Rwandans. 
a. Growing up, were you aware of ethnicity? Was it taught in school? 
b. What does ethnicity mean to you? Could you define it? 
c. Do you think your experience from 1959 through 1994 has shaped this idea of ethnicity? If so, how? 
d. What about your experience post-1994? If so, how? 
2.  Explore the shifts in the meaning of ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ over time. 
a. What do you think it means to identify by ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa?’ 
3.  Analyze the political and cultural implications these identities had (or have now) in the lives of Rwandans. 
a. What do you think being ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ means to the government? 
b. What do you think it means in everyday life? 
c. Do ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ associated themselves in the same social circles? 
d. How do you feel the idea of identifying as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa have shifted in your lifetime? 
4.  Explore the strength behind modern identifications as ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ or Rwandan and how this fits in with society. 
a. Are there still practices or traditions that are identified with these ethnic identities? 
b. How strongly did you identify as ‘Hutu, Tutsi, Twa’ before the conflict began? 
c. How strongly do you identify with your ethnicity now? 
5.  Identify positive and negative consequences and intentions of the Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme as it is used in the 
context of ethnicity in Rwanda. 
a. How do you feel the conversation on ethnicity is today in Rwanda? 
b. What are the positive and negative aspects of this dialogue? 
c. Do you feel the Ndi Umunyarwanda Programme has had positive consequences? 
d. Do you feel this program is negating ethnicity in any ways? 
e. Have you heard the critique that Rwanda is negating ethnicity What is your response? 
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How a Tweet 
Brought People to 
the Street: Social 
Media and the 
Success of Ni Una 
Menos 
 
KAYLA FRAIN  
 
“Ni Una Menos is part of that revolutionary 
lineage of feminist’s politics in Argentina. We 
are the daughters of their disobedience. We are 
the locas, or crazy women, as the Madres [de 
Plaza de Mayo] were called. We are the heirs of 
the desaparecidas [disappeared] and the 
feminist organizations that came before us. We 
translate this powerful heritage into a political 
language trained in queer poetry and literature, a 
movement that I like to call las lenguas de las 
locas, [the language of the insane], amplified by 
a critical use of the tools of communications 
technology.” - Cecilia Palmeiro, member of Ni 
Una Menos since 2015 
Abstract  
Femicide is a problem all over the globe, 
taking one women every six hours. In 
Argentina, the Ni Una Menos movement was 
formed with the main goal of decreasing the 
number of femicides happening in Argentina 
each year. The Ni Una Menos movement draws 
from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st 
century mass media to galvanize the public 
towards effective social and political change. 
 
Literature Review  
When Chiara Paez was 14 years old and a few 
weeks pregnant, she was beaten to death by her boyfriend 
and his mother. Her body was found after a three day 
search in the garden of her boyfriend's house. A few 
months prior, Daiana Garcia, 19 years old, was found on 
the side of the road. All of her remains were inside a 
garbage bag. Maria Eugenia Lanzetti, 44-year-old 
schoolteacher was killed in front of her students by her 
husband when he cut her throat. Andrea Tacumán was 
shot dead by her boyfriend. Fiorella Aghem was 
murdered in the Misiones provinces by her boyfriend. Her 
body was found in the middle of a yerba plantation. 
Vanina Cattáneo was set on fire by her partner, suffering 
from burns on 50 percent of her body. She died a few 
days later. Angeles Rawson was 16 when she disappeared 
on the way home from gym class. Her body was found by 
a worker at a garbage processing plant outside of Buenos 
Aires. Behind every femicide there is a story just like one 
of these. These are just a few examples of the gender 
violence that is happening every single day in Argentina. 
The violent killings of women are not new, but 
within the last six years they have become more 
prominent in the Argentina’s news reports. The 
statistics are startling about gender violence in 
Argentina; a woman dies every 30 hours due to 
gender based violence; one child is left without 
a mother every 26 hours. These crimes are 
called “femicides”. Femicides are the killing of 
women because of their gender. These crimes 
against women can take many forms. They are 
committed in both public and private places, 
during the night or in broad daylight, and 
sometimes there is even a bystander. Femicide 
can be seen as both a political and a public 
health problem and it needs to be addressed.  
Argentina is a country where the gender 
norms are extremely prevalent. These women 
are expected to fulfill a role inside of the house 
where they take care of both the children and 
household (Marini 1977). After the economic 
crisis in 2001-2002 there was hope that the 
government would begin to help change these 
gender norms as most families were sinking into 
poverty. Instead with ‘Plan Familias’ and 
‘Universal child allowance’ the government 
inadvertently discouraged women from seeking 
non-motherhood paid employment and 
reinforced traditional gender roles (Lopreite 
2015). 98 percent of the direct recipients of the 
allowance were mothers in the universal child 
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allowance program (Lopreite 2015). The 
traditional roles of motherhood are something 
that Argentina is proud of and believes is the 
best for the country (Marini 1977).  
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were 
some of the first women to push the limits as to 
what it means to be a mother. The Mothers 
stepped outside of the house and made their 
voices heard. They were standing up for their 
children and elevating women's agency by 
speaking out. During the Guerra Sucia (Dirty 
War) in Argentina, 30,000 people were taken by 
the dictatorship for speaking out against the 
government (Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the 
missing children, the mothers took to the street 
to look for their children. The children who 
disappeared were of all ages. Many were in their 
teens, early 20s and 30s, most of which had 
strong feelings against the dictatorship (Luengo 
2018). The dictatorship wanted to “purge from 
society the idea of subversion along with the 
ideologies and political traditions that junta 
leaders connected with” (Lewis 2001). The 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were some of the 
first people in Argentina to fight for human 
rights and to acknowledge that what the 
dictatorship did was not legal (Luengo 2018). 
The Mothers paved the way for a human rights 
discussions, demonstrated how to grow 
awareness and demand justice.  
Néston Kirchner came into power in 2003 and 
made a change to focus more on global human 
rights (Muengo 2018). With the large emphasis 
on human rights, some women begin to make 
the argument that women’s rights are human 
rights (Borland, 2007, Lopreite, 2012). With the 
improved definition of human rights the context 
was set up for the creation of the Ni Una 
Menos80 movement. Social media plays an 
important role in how people communicate with 
each other and how information can be spread 
(Youmans 2012, Kidd 2016). The Ni Una 
Menos movement uses social media to grow 
 
80  Not One Less. Movement that started in Argentina 
in 2015. Not one less woman dies of femicide in 
Argentina.  
awareness, strategize and promote their cause. 
The Ni Una Menos movement began with a 
tweet from Ojeda after hearing about another 
femicide (Fuentes 2019). Feminists, activists, 
women and men throughout all of Argentina 
decided that they had had enough and began to 
demand the end to femicide. The use of the 
hashtag, #niunamenos, is an essential part of the 
movement and has allowed people to identify 
the Ni Una Menos movement and join the cause 
(Luengo 2018). 
The Ni Una Menos movement draws 
from the success of the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo while at the same time integrating 21st 
century mass media to galvanize the public 
towards effective social and political change. 
This paper will discuss the social movement 
methods that the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
used and the methods that the Ni Una Menos 
movement is currently using. The resource 
mobilization theory will be used to evaluate the 
success of the two movements. The resource 
mobilization theory is based on the idea that 
there must be available resources that can be 
mobilized in order for successful social 
movements to occur (McCarthy and Zald 1977) 
Twitter and Facebook will be the main mass 
media platforms that will be analyzed 
throughout, as these platforms are the most 
popular vehicles used by the Ni Una Menos 
movement. At the time of the Ni Una Menos 
movement, many people saw the role of women 
to be inside of the house and taking care of 
children. As Argentina has progressed more and 
more women are living professional lives and 
choosing not to marry or conform to the 
traditional norms. The Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo movement were obeying these gendered 
norms, as they were doing what any mother 
would do, look for their missing children. The 
Ni Una Menos is something that Argentina has 
never seen before. The role of social media 
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real traction, pushing this movement forward to 
make both social and political change 
Femicide 
According to the World Health 
Organization, “Femicide is generally understood 
to involve intentional murder of women because 
they are women, but broader definitions include 
any killings of women or girls” (World Health 
Organization 2014). Femicide is often 
committed by a man, and sometimes female 
family members can assist in the killings. 
Femicide differs from homicide because the 
cases of femicide are perpetrated by partners, 
ex-partners, male family members, and usually 
involve ongoing abuse in the home, sexual 
violence, threats, and intimindations. These are 
situations where the woman has significantly 
less power than the man.  
 Femicide is very prevalent around the 
world but especially in Latin America. Out of 
the top 25 countries with the highest rates of 
femicide around the world, 14 of them are in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region.  
 Figure 1 demonstrates the prevalence of 
femicide in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 
2018, Brazil had the most femicides with 1,206 
deaths. This is such a significant number of 
women to be killed by their male partner. 
Argentina had 255 femicides in 2018. 255 is 
still a strikingly high number and is significant 
since this is way too many women to be dying 
due to femicide.  
 
Figure 1: United Nations Economic 
 
81  The lower house of Argentina’s Congress 
Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. 2018. 
As indicated by the figure above, 
femicide is not just a problem in Argentina, it is 
spread throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean.   
It can be argued that the start of the Ni 
Una Menos movement began in 2012. On April 
18, 2012 Argentina’s Cámara de Diputados81 
approved a bill that amends the Criminal Code, 
“Law No. 11.179 of 1984, art. 80 to include 
femicide as an aggravated type of homocide” 
(Rodriguez-Ferrand, 2012). 
 “The new provision includes the 
sanction of life imprisonment for an 
individual who kills his ascendant or 
descendant relative, spouse or former 
spouse, or a person with whom he has or 
has had an intimate relationship, even if 
they were not living together at the time 
of the crime. Femicide is defined as a 
crime of murder perpetrated by a man 
against a woman in the context of gender 
violence” (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012). 
The new amendment gives a definition 
to femicide, which was very much needed in 
Argentina. The levels of gender based violence 
had only been growing leading up to the 
amendment, so this was a much anticipated 
change that had to be made (Rodriguez-Ferrand 
2012). In the year leading up to the amendment 
of the Criminal Code, there had been an 
increase rate of femicides in the country by 20 
percent (Rodriguez-Ferrand 2012). Before the 
Criminal Code had been amended the murder 
would have just been considered a homicide. In 
addition to declaring femicide an aggravated 
form of homicide, the law denounces the killing 
of women as a crime of passion. Men could no 
longer claim that the killing of the wife or the 
girlfriend was a crime of passion or love 
(Piscopo 2016). They were committing murder 
and now that State of Argentina said they would 
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recognize that, which seemed like a large 
victory for many. 
When the State of Argentina changed 
the law because of the increasing numbers of 
femicide, it gave the Ni Una Menos movement 
legitimacy. Many people were ambitious that 
this law would start to make a difference. By 
including femicide in the law, hope was given to 
the people of Argentina that the government 
would start paying more attention to all of the 
femicides occurring around the country. There 
was an aspiration that funding would be 
allocated to do more research, or even start to 
provide resources to people who were suffering 
in violent relationships. This law was only the 
beginning of femicide becoming more 
recognized across the country. It is often the 
case that in Latin America and other countries, 
where police, public prosecutors and judges in 
Argentina fail to take violence against women 
and girls seriously (Piscopo 2016). This 
amendment to the Criminal Code provided hope 
for activists, women, and many around the 
country.  
Taking a closer look at Argentina we can 
see that over the last 10 years the number of 
femicides have remained high. Every year the 
total number of femicides is above 200 but stays 
slightly below 300 femicides. Over the last few 
years the trend has been over 250 femicides 
each year.  
 
Figure 2: La Casa Del Encuentro 2018. 
Looking closely at the graph, one can notice that 
in 2012 to 2013 the number of femicides 
actually increased. As noted earlier, 2012 is the 
year that in Argentina the bill was passed that 
amended the Criminal Code. Now that 
femicides have been acknowledged by the law 
of Argentina for the first time, one could argue 
that it gave women and families the confidence 
that they needed to denounce gender-based 
violence occurring in their homes and within 
their friends and family. This is why there is 
such a large jump in the number of femicides 
that have been reported from 2012 to 2013.  
In Argentina, a woman dies every 30 
hours due to gender violence (Chenou and 
Cepeda-Masemala 2019). A femicide can be 
defined as “killing women because of their 
gender” (Luengo 2018). Femicides are the cause 
of machismo which means strong masculine 
pride. Men feel as though they need to assert 
their dominance, so they kill their wife or 
girlfriend to prove their machismo. The Ni Una 
Menos movement describes femicide as, “as an 
action carried out by a person in order to punish 
and psychically destroy a woman considered to 
be someone’s property and they see this as an 
act of mass murder of humanity in the body of a 
woman” (Abrego 2017). There are two different 
forms of femicide. There can be intimate 
femicides, where women are dying inside of 
their home and public/warlike femicides, when 
women are dying in public places with 
bystanders (Segato 2016). Segato proposes that 
“there have never been more protective laws for 
women’s rights, training sessions for security 
forces, more published literature in circulation 
about women’s rights, more prizes and 
recognitions for accomplishments in the field of 
women’s rights, and yet we women continue 
dying” (Segato 2016). One of the biggest issues 
for Argentina is that no one is enforcing the 
laws. As Segato mentioned, the legal protection 
for women exists in Argentina, the problem is 
implementation. In 1931, Argentina was the 
first country to pass a statutory quota law which 
required at least 30 percent of political parties’ 
nominees for the national legislature to be 
women (Piscopo 2016). Similarly, in 2003, a 
trade union passed a quota law which required 
women to hold 30 percent of seats on labor 
unions’ directorates (Piscopo 2016). In 2002, 
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there was a law passed mandating free 
contraception and in 2006 a comprehensive 
sexual education in public schools was required. 
Yet contraception and sexual education is still 
underprovided in many rural areas throughout 
Argentina (Piscopo 2016). There is a need to 
draw attention to the fact that Argentina’s 
government is not implementing the laws. It 
seems that there is a large disconnect. 
Discrimination is widespread throughout the 
country and there is limited political will and 
public pressure to systematically tackle gender 
descrimination. The community of Argentina as 
a whole needs to focus on these femicides and 
try to come up with a solution because the 
current plan is not strong enough. Women need 
to stop dying because they are a woman. When 
discussing femicides, Rita Segato states,  
“the warlike attitude toward women's 
bodies in patriarchy and in its collective 
representations used to have the 
character of the Conquest of a territory 
and its annexation including possession 
through individual and collective rape or 
through slavery for sexual services” 
(Abrego 2017). 
In a patriarchal country that has thickly rooted 
cultural norms of machismo, it takes time to 
break through these walls. With the use of social 
media the Ni Una Menos movement has been 
able to gain global attention and make a call to 
action for women, citizens and politicians, that 
would not have been made possible without the 
aid of social media.  
Traditional Gender Roles 
Argentina is a country where the gender 
norms are very prevalent in the society. It is 
expected that the women stay home, cook, clean 
and most importantly take care of the children. 
“The praise of the family as the foundation of 
society and of parental roles as the most 
important vehicle for the transmission of and 
control upon the observance of Christian and 
patriotic virtues” (Marini 1977). The image of 
women as the caregivers fulfills the Christian 
and political viewpoint that the place for the 
women is inside of the house. It is also stressed 
in the media that it is not the intention to 
confine women to the household but if they 
choose to venture outside, their household 
duties must always come first (Marini 1977).  
Women for the most part are seen inside 
of the home. In figure 3, it demonstrates how 
the majority of the jobs in the population are 
filled by males. In 2019, over 60 percent of the 
male population was employed and only 40 
percent of the female population was employed. 
The graph shows the trend of the two bars 
coming closer together. This provides hope that 
women are reaching some equality in the 
workplace.  
 
Figure 3: “World Development Indicators.” 
2019 
Women play an essential role in the 
Argentine society and the government does their 
best to reinforce these roles through specific 
policies. After the economic crisis in 2001 - 
2002 the government created a program called 
“Plan Familias” (Lopreite 2015). The intention 
of this program was to pay cash transfers to 
poor women who were working as a mother 
(Lopreite 2015). Yes, this program 
acknowledged motherhood as a job, but it 
reinforced the traditional gender roles of women 
as mothers. Furthermore, it discouraged women 
from seeking non-motherhood paid 
employment. The government also created 
“Universal child allowance” (Lopreite 2015). 
This piece of legislation was intended to 
encourage families to vaccinate their children 
and send them to school (Lopreite 2015). When 
this was done, the household would receive 
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compensation. The program was designed to be 
gender neutral but when it was put into action, 
98 percent of the recipients were mothers 
(Lopreite 2015). The goal of this program was 
to help reduce poverty and this part was 
successful. The unintended consequence was 
the reinforcement of traditional gender roles. 
These two programs have now stopped due to 
government funding, but when they were both 
in full force, these programs were contributing 
to the long established gender roles in 
Argentina.  
Guerra Sucia  
The Guerra Sucia82 began in 1975 and 
lasted until 1983 (Scharpf, Balcells, & Sullivan, 
2018). During this time “a campaign of state 
terrorism against real and suspected enemies of 
the state, leads to the death and disappearance of 
tens of thousands of Argentines and foreign 
nationals” (Lewis 2001). The goals of the 
dictatorship was to “purge from society the idea 
of subversion along with the ideologies and 
political traditions that junta leaders connected 
with” (Lewis, 2001). Most of the victims were 
young, in their teens to 30s. “This self-terrorism 
claimed around 30,000 disappearances of 
mostly students, according to their families. 
Whatever happened to all these people is still 
kept secret, but stories of torture, killings and 
burials at sea surfaced from the few witnesses” 
(Bondrea 2014). In reaction to the missing 
children in Argentina, the Mothers took to the 
streets to demand answers about those who had 
disappeared. Since the first time that the 
Mothers challenged the dictatorship, they have 
been making waves across Argentina. The 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo serve as an 
inspiration for the Ni Una Menos movement 
because they paved the way for human rights 
discussions, demonstrated how to build and 
grow awareness and demand justice from the 
government. The Mothers now serve as a 
symbol of resistance for the Ni Una Menos 
movement. 
 
82  The Dirty War 
Resource Mobilization Theory 
 The resource mobilization theory is 
based on the idea that there must be available 
resources that can be mobilized in order for 
successful social movements to occur 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). “Resource 
mobilization theory views social movements as 
normal, rational, institutionally rootes, political 
challenges by aggrieved groups” (Beneford 
2000). The resource mobilization theory states 
that most social movements are based on 
grievances. There must be a support base, 
constituents, individuals or organizations that 
provide support. Social movement organizations 
have a number of strategic tasks, “these tasks 
include mobilizing supporters, neutralizing 
and/or transforming mass and elite publics into 
sympathizers, achieving change in targets” 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977). The resource 
mobilization theory also notes that there needs 
to be a relation to larger society. Most 
importantly the resource mobilization theory 
requires the presence of a resource. The 
resource mobilization theory is able to 
determine if a social movement is successful or 
not. 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
In 1977, the mothers of the disappeared children 
mobilized to the streets to demand the truth about their 
children. When these mothers took to the street, many 
people were taken aback. The traditional gender roles in 
Argentina imply that a woman should be in the 
household. One viewpoint is that the Mothers were 
fulfilling their traditional gender roles by making their 
way to the street to inquire more information about their 
children, as opposed to acting against these traditional 
roles, for a mother in Argentina their babies are 
everything. Mothers invest time, energy and money into 
their children; as they are their livelihood. So when 
someone takes your children, the response is simple and 
quite obvious; you try to find your child, your everything. 
The Mothers did what they did best, they were 
looking out for their children. “Men tended to 
be the main wage earner so they could not spend 
everyday looking for their children. Women 
have been socialized to be obedient and passive, 
they could not simply refused to be okay with 
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the loss of their child” (Malin 1994). Women 
were filling their traditional role of motherhood 
by showing up to march. To the Mothers, the 
movement was not seen as extreme or radical at 
the time. In the moment it was quite simple, the 
government had committed horrific human 
rights violations by taking their children, and 
they not only wanted, but needed answers. The 
Mothers showed up to the plaza with nothing 
more than their bodies and the intention of 
finding out more about their children.  
The Mothers were persistent about 
finding the truth out about their children. They 
gathered in front of the Casa Rosada, which is 
the headquarters of the Argentine government in 
Buenos Aires. When the mothers of the 
disappeared first met they were just looking for 
answers from the government. After being 
turned down time and time again by officials, 
they decided it was time for them to take 
another approach. They began displaying the 
names and photographs of their loved ones who 
were part of the disappeared. The Mothers were 
gaining a great deal of attention from the people 
walking by. The plaza was a public place, so 
many people found out about their grievances. 
Soon after, the mothers decided to begin 
marching on Thursdays in the plaza. On April 
30th, 1977, 14 brave women took to the streets 
to confront the brutal dictatorship and find 
answers to who had stolen their children 
(Femenía 1987). Four decades later and the 
Mothers have continued marching every 
Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon (Goñi 2017). 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo have 
completed 2,037 marches as of 2017 (Goñi 
2017). 
Resource Mobilization Theory and The Mothers 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
movement can be applied to the resource 
mobilization theory to prove that it was a 
successful movement. When looking at the 
movement from a birds eye view it is easy to 
think that the Mothers did not have many 
 
83 Pink House 
resources at their disposal. Even with the 
limited resources the Mothers made sure to 
mobilize them in an effective way. The Mothers 
utilized the Plaza de Mayo, the white 
handkerchief, and the role of Motherhood.  
The Plaza de Mayo is an open public 
space. At one end of the Plaza there is the Casa 
Rosada83, which is the home to the President 
(Bondera 2014). The Mothers originally started 
congregating there because they wanted to get 
the attention of government officials (Bondera 
2014). As the government was actively ignoring 
the angry Mothers, people who passed by would 
ask questions and were curious about what was 
going on in front of the Casa Rosada (Bondera 
2014). The location of the Plaza de Mayo served 
as a strong resource for the Mothers because 
they were able to spread the word about their 
movement and inform curious citizens about the 
violations of human rights that the government 
committed.  
Another resource that the Mothers 
ultized is their symbol of the white 
handkerchief. The white handkerchief is also the 
white diaper kerchiefs and is what is used to 
recognize the Mothers. This is an unlikely 
resource but one that was very successful with 
this movement. The image of the white 
handkerchief distributed throughout the 
community also helped get the word out of the 
movement. It also provided a constant reminder 
about the violations that the dictatorship had 
committed.  
 The final resource that the Mothers used 
to their advantage is the traditional gender 
norms. Like it has been mentioned before, the 
traditional role of Motherhood is ingrained in 
Argentine culture. Mothers are expected to take 
care of their children and the household. When 
their children disappeared, the Mothers see it as 
their duty to find their children. The Mothers 
utilize their traditional role of Motherhood to 
expand this obligation and show other Mothers 
that they can be doing more with their lives. The 
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Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo mobilized their 
role and were able to get hundreds of women to 
march with them across Argentina to find 
answers about their missing children.  
Although not obvious upon first glance, 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo movement 
can be applied to the resource mobilization 
theory. The Mothers utilize three resources, the 
Plaza, the white handkerchief, and the 
traditional role of Motherhood. Resource 
mobilization theory places a large emphasis on 
resources and opportunity (Buechler 1993). To 
evaluate how the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
utilize the resource mobilization theory, it will 
be defined into three parts, support base, 
strategy and tactics, and relation to larger 
society (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
 The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo is a 
social movement that is based upon grievances. 
The Mothers are marching because they are 
grieving their disappeared children who are 
presumably dead. When the Mothers began their 
marches they were not really supported by 
anyone. This is not to say that people were 
against what they were marching for but public 
organizations did not immediately take notice. 
The Mothers used a public and open area to 
congregate so they did not need to have any 
supporters provide that. The Mothers really did 
not rely on any outside help from organizations. 
They were just happy when people wanted to 
join them in the search for their children.  
 The tactics used by the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo to mobilize supporters were the 
role of Motherhood and word of mouth. The 
Mothers movement emphasized that the role of 
a mother was to look for their children, and it 
was their duty to find out what happened to 
them.. Mothers also utilized word of mouth. By 
talking about the disappearances they were able 
to spread awareness of where they were meeting 
each week to get more citizens to join them.  
 The resource mobilization theory 
highlights the resources that the Mothers 
utilized to make their movement successful. The 
Mothers took advantage of the public Plaza de 
Mayo and its location in front of the Casa Rosa, 
the classic image and symbolism of the white 
handkerchief and the expansion from the 
traditional gender roles of a woman.  
Counter Argument  
It can be argued that the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo play an important role of the Ni 
Una Menos movement. The Mothers serve as an 
inspiration as they paved the way for women to 
advocate for their rights. But this was not the 
Mothers intention. By taking to the street every 
Thursday at 3:30pm the it can be argued that the 
Mothers were just fulfilling their role of 
Motherhood and nothing more.  
The role of women is essential to the 
Argentine culture. It is expected that the women 
of Argentina fulfill all their duties inside of the 
household before they venture out. The daily 
life in Argentina is gendered. So for women this 
means that they are the primary caregivers for 
children and of their household (Borland 2007). 
With this knowledge it is quite clear to make the 
connection with why women took to the streets. 
During the Dirty War many kids were taken, 
they had disappeared. Their mothers had no idea 
where they were, so naturally they began to search 
for their children. When a child is missing the expected 
response of a mother is to look for her child. So it was not 
surprising that the Mothers took to the streets because this 
was fulfilling their role as a Mother. As women began to 
protest, they were still expected to be taking care of the 
household and children (Borland 2007). The 
mothers of the disappeared were fulfilling their 
role of motherhood when they took to the streets 
to look for their children. 
This argument is important. Yes, the 
Mothers did fulfill their role of a women when 
they began marching around the Plaza de Mayo. 
But in doing this they did so much more. I am 
arguing that the primary goal of the women 
protesting was to empower other women and to 
create a space where you can challenge the 
status quo. The Mothers saw the wave of 
protests as an opportunity to make demands for 
gender equity and social justice.  
The resource mobilization theory 
provides us with a comprehensive way to 
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analyze the success of a movement. When 
applying the resource mobilization theory to the 
Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, it is clear that 
they are successful. The Ni Una Menos 
movement adopts some key elements from the 
Mothers which further the Ni Una Menos 
argument and cause. A large part of the success 
that Ni Una Menos has had is due to the 
Mothers, but another extremely important part 
of the puzzle is social media. Social media is Ni 
Una Menos resource and they utilize all aspects 
of this tool. The Ni Una Menos movement 
draws from the success of the Mothers of the 
Plaza de Mayo while at the same time 
integrating 21st century mass media to 
galvanize the public towards effective social 
and political change.  
Resource Mobilization Theory 
Social media is also the driving factor in 
the success of the Ni Una Menos movement. 
The resource mobilization theory model can be 
applied to the Ni Una Menos movement to 
analyze the success of the movement so far. 
Resource mobilization emerged in the 1970s by 
McCarthy and Zald as a way to study social 
movements. According to the resource 
mobilization perspective, “social movements are 
an extension of politics by other means, and can 
be analyzed in terms of conflicts of interest just 
like other political struggle. Movements are also 
seen as structured and patterned, so that they 
can be analyzed in terms of organizational 
dynamics just like other forms of institutional 
action” (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Resource 
mobilization theory emphasizes resources and 
opportunity (Buechler 1993). The resource 
mobilization theory highlights the interaction 
between resource availability, the preexisting 
organization of preference structures and 
entrepreneurs attempts to meet preference 
demand (McCarthy and Zald 1977). The Ni Una 
Menos movement utilizes social media as a 
resource and incorporates it into already 
existing organizations. Through applying the 
resource mobilization theory to the Ni Una 
Menos movement it is clear that the success of 
the movement is because of the utilization of 
social media. To evaluate how Ni Una Menos 
utilizes the resource mobilization theory, it will 
be evaluated in three parts: support base, 
strategy and tactics, and relation to larger 
society. 
Resource 
In the 21st century social media was created, 
which made news spread at an even faster rate. People are 
able to access news and information at their fingertips. 
For this paper, social media will be defined as a "group of 
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological 
and technological foundations of Web 2.0 that allow for 
the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” 
(Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Platforms such as Youtube, 
Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Whatsapp and Facebook 
are the most common in Argentina. As of 2018, the 
leading social media platform in Argentina was Youtube, 
where 93 percent of internet users utilize Youtube. Not 
far behind was Facebook at 91 percent, Instagram at 68 
percent and Twitter at 46 percent ("Leading social 
media platforms in Argentina as of 3rd quarter 
2018" 2019). When someone posts on these 
platforms, they are creating user generated 
content. User generated content can be 
described as “various forms of media content 
that are publicly available and created by end 
users” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010).  
For something to be considered user 
generated content it must fulfill three basic 
requirements. The first requirement is that it 
must be published on a publicly accessible 
website or on a social networking site. The 
second says it needs to show creative effort, and 
the third demands that it be created outside of 
the professional setting (Kaplan and Haenlein 
2010). These social networks have allowed for 
the mobilization of social groups not just in 
Argentina but around the world. Social media 
allows people to connect even though they may 
be millions of miles away, and because of this 
social media can make the world feel smaller. 
Social media can also be used to facilitate 
events and ease the spread of information 
because all you have to do is “share” or 
“retweet” the news with a click of a button. It 
allows people to reach a wider audience at a 
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much faster pace. Social media is the driving 
factor for the creation, mobilization and success 
of the Ni Una Menos movement.  
Many people are optimistic that social 
media will be monumental in relation to social 
movements. The term “techno-optimism” refers 
to “those approaches that emphasize the 
potential of social media technologies to solve 
social problems” (Kidd 2016). While there are 
some challenges with social media, techno-
optimists focus on the positive. Social 
movements that utilize technology are not solely 
on the internet, as it is important that they have 
a balance of both communication via social 
media and in person. Social movements like the 
Ni Una Menos movement use social media to 
organize, generate awareness and spread 
information. “New social movements 
spontaneously generate in moments of 
indignation and spread virally, both online and 
off” (Kidd 2016). By having both social media 
and in person communication, social 
movements are ensuring that everyone is 
informed.  
 However, being too optimistic of social 
media raises concerns. There are three major 
flaws, “(i) it overstates the newness of social 
media; (ii) it jumps to prediction without 
evidence; and (iii) it underestimates the capacity 
of existing hegemonies to adapt to technology” 
(Kidd 2016). The Ni Una Menos movement has 
done a good job with balancing the use of social 
media and in person protests. It is great to have 
faith in social media, but one must remember 
that there are limitations to almost everything.  
Support Base - Mothers  
 The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo 
inspired the Ni Una Menos movement and set 
the stage for the movement to take place. Both 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Ni 
Una Menos movement are based upon 
grievances towards the government. The 
Mothers provide support to Ni Una Menos by 
physically showing up to rallies and marches 
and by providing inspiration in their fight. 
Fighting for human rights, developing 
awareness and demanding justice are three areas 
that the Mothers have provided support for Ni 
Una Menos.  
Human Rights 
 The Mothers believed that when the 
dictatorship took their children that they were in 
direct violation of human rights. The actions 
taken by the dictatorship were wrong. No 
human should be taken away from their family 
and killed because of their beliefs. The Mothers 
felt that “all human lives are valuable and 
deserving of respect, regardless of the 
individual’s particular ideological or political 
affiliation” (Luengo 2018). The Mothers used 
the human rights argument as they marched 
each Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon in 
Buenos Aires. It was not until Argentina 
became a democracy in 1983 that the country 
officially recognized human rights as something 
that is legitimate and decided that as a country 
they were going to pay more attention to the 
human rights violations within their country 
(Lopreite 2012). Many were energized by the 
countries new commitment, “Argentina’s new 
commitment to human rights provided a new 
opportunity structure for women, and all 
citizens” (Lopreite 2012) This new 
governmental acknowledgement of human 
rights allowed people to examine the atrocities 
that happened during the Dirty War but also 
provides hope for the future that there will be 
limited violations. The commitment to human 
rights also informed people of what their rights 
were as humans allowing them to know and be 
aware of the times when these rights were being 
taken away from citizens. Under President 
Néstor Kirchner, the term human rights began to 
develop more traction in the country. Kirchner 
established close links with many human rights 
organizations, which included the Mothers and 
Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. This was a 
very symbolic act by Krichner and was 
continued on by his predecessor, Cristina 
Krichner. The attention to human rights is the 
immediate context for the immersion of the Ni 
Una Menos movement.  
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 The Mothers marched in the street 
because of the human rights violations that 
occurred to their children. It can be argued that 
the Mothers were the first group to advocate for 
a human rights violations in the form of a social 
movement. The Mothers determination to find 
answers about their children inspired the Ni Una 
Menos movement. The Ni Una Menos 
movement echoes the fight of the Mothers for 
human rights issues.  
Developing Awareness 
The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo quickly 
developed a routine after seeing just how many 
women came to join the movement. The 
movements began with just a few mothers 
walking down to the house of the President to 
try and discover more information. Everytime 
the authorities refused to allow the women to 
proceed any further. As time went on, this 
gathering of Mothers grew exponentially. The 
Mothers utilized word of mouth to spread 
information. The Mothers also made themselves 
known by protesting in a public place. Since 
they were in the plaza, it is a very public place. 
People who were walking by and curious about 
the Mothers were about to spread awareness 
about their fight and grow the movement that 
way. In no time the movement had grown to 
about 300 women. Once the movement got to a 
significant size they became more structured. 
The Mothers met every Thursday at 3:30 in the 
afternoon, wearing a white head kerchief and 
chanting “Bring them back alive” (Bondrea 
2014). The Mothers did a lot to develop their 
image and bring awareness to their cause.  
The repetition of the movement is one of 
the key factors that helped bring awareness to 
the movement. The Mothers became a symbol 
of reliability. The people in the community 
knew that if they wanted to participate in a 
march, the Mothers would be at the plaza every 
Thursday at 3:30 in the afternoon. The white 
handkerchief also helped bring attention to the 
cause. The white handkerchief allowed the 
Mothers to be easily identified and quickly 
became a symbol for the movement. Also by 
having the white handkerchief become the 
symbol, this was able to be drawn, put on 
posters and spread throughout the country. The 
white handkerchief are one of the most 
distinguishing features of the Mothers (Bondrea 
2014). Whenever one sees a white handkerchief 
on the sidewalk or in a poster, the immediate 
association is the Mothers. The Ni Una Menos 
also utilizes the handkerchief which ties them to 
the Mothers. For the Mothers, the handkerchief 
represents diapers and the purity of Motherhood 
(Bouvard 2004).  
The Ni Una Menos movement learned 
from the Mothers how to bring awareness to 
their movement. Even though the Ni Una 
Menos movement occurs a few decades later the 
strategies used by the Mothers are still relevant. 
The Mothers utilized word of mouth. Mothers 
would tell other moms about their plans and 
then they would all meet up. With the use of 
technology, the spread of information can be 
wider. So for the Ni Una Menos movement 
word of mouth is also used, but takes place on 
social media. People are sharing with their 
friends, inviting others and texting everyone that 
they know about a gathering. The Mothers also 
used the plaza to their advantage to bring 
awareness to their cause. The plaza for the 
Mothers is like social media to Ni Una Menos. 
Social media is a public platform that Ni Una 
Menos uses to spread their message. Another 
tactic that made the Mother successful is their 
consistency and reliability. The Mothers met 
every Thursday at the same time in the same 
place (Bondrea 2014). The Ni Una Menos 
movement embodies this strategy by marching 
every June 3rd. The protest on June 3rd is both 
consistent and reliable. When the Ni Una Menos 
took it upon themselves to also use a 
handkerchief, they were using the symbol that 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo use. The 
green handkerchief echoes the white one of the 
Madres, “activists today are making the 
connections to the women who have led 
struggles and refused to give up on their vision 
of social justice for decades” (Levy 2017). The 
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handkerchief is a direct connection between the 
two social movements and it is something that 




 Demanding Justice 
The Mothers also represent persistence 
in their demand for justice. When the authorities 
told the Mothers that they could not go any 
further into the President's house, this did not 
stop them. The Mothers were on a mission. The 
determination of the Mothers is exhibited in the 
spirit of the Ni Una Menos movement. The Ni 
Una Menos movement demands justice for 
victims of femicide and an end to femicide, but 
they do not stop there. The movement also 
demands equal pays and abortion rights for 
women in Argentine. The inspiration to demand 
for justice in the Ni Una Menos movement 
comes from the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo. 
Like the Mothers, the Ni Una Menos movement 
is a symbol of resistance.  
Support Base - Creation of the Ni Una Menos 
Movement 
An essential building block of the Ni 
Una Menos movement was the reading 
marathon that took place in March 2015. The 
reading marathon aimed to raise awareness of 
the killings of women in Argentina(Luengo 
2018). The event was sparked after the murder 
of nineteen-year-old Daiana García. The reading 
marathon event was launched on social media 
through a Facebook page that encouraged 
activists, journalists, artists, writers and families 
who had been affected by femicide to join “a 
marathon of readings, projections and 
performances against femicide” (Fuentes 2019). 
The event was called “Ni Una Menos” by 
Vanina Escales, as she wanted to give urgency 
is the response needed for the daily murders of 
women (Fuentes 2019, Chenou and Cepeda-
 
84 Actresses, politicians, artists, business women, 
social representatives … women, all of us, bah … 
are we not going to raise our voices? THEY ARE 
KILLING US. 
Másmela 2019). During the event, participants 
exchanged stories, testimonials, and hopes for 
the future of women and activists. The reading 
marathon played a large role in the creation of 
the Ni Una Menos movement as it was useful in 
presenting the problem at hand: violence against 
women. It also enlarged the audience by making 
more people aware of the issue. This was 
achieved by having the event be created on 
social media, thus making easier for people to 
invite their networks. Ni Una Menos also took 
what they had learned from the Mothers about 
building awareness at had the reading marathon 
in a public place. They decided to host the event 
in a central location, the national library of 
Buenos Aires. Here, people were able to join the 
reading marathon even if they had not heard of 
the event prior.  
On May 11th, 2015, radio journalist 
Marcela Ojeda was outraged to hear about yet 
another femicide in Argentina. Ojeda posted a 
single tweet that sparked the global movement 
Ni Una Menos, “Actrices, políticas, artistas, 
empresarias, referentes sociales...mujeres, todas, 
bah...no vamos a levantar la voz? NOS ESTAN 
MATANDO”84. Ojeda’s tweet was in response 
to the discovery of Chiara Paéz body, a fourteen 
year old girl buried alive. The tweet triggered a 
response of 252 likes and 197 retweets85 
(Fuentes 2019). Ojeda’s tweet prompted the 
street demonstrations across all of Argentina. 
Marcela Ojeda was not the only one who took to 
Twitter to voice her frustration. She was joined 
by television journalist Florence Etcheves, 
journalist Hinde Pomeraniec, director of 
Barcelona Ingrid Beck, and television journalist 
Valeria Sampedro. The group of women began 
to organize a march that would bring awareness 
to femicide and call for action. Even though 
these women had not met each other before, 
they were all united under the same cause.  
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These women used social media to get 
the word out about the first march. They created 
a NiUnaMenos twitter account, which now has 
69.6K followers so they could continue to 
spread the news. The women asked friends and 
family members to post pictures with the 
hashtag #niunamenos just so they could get the 
word out more. Through doing so, the women 
were working to make the problem visible.  
Less than a month after Ojeda’s tweet 
the first march had been organized and took 
place June 3, 2015. There were about 200,000 
people in Buenos Aires and thousands of people 
in cities all across Argentina that took place in 
the march (Chenou and Cepeda-Mámela 2019). 
Out of the 200,000 people who attended the 
march in Buenos Aires, 61.2 percent of the 
people marching found out about the march 
through a form of social media.  
 
 
Figure 4: De Angelis, Carlos. 2015. 
This data emphasizes the point that 
social media was so important in getting people 
to the streets for the Ni Una Menos movement. 
Social media allowed for the leaders of the 
movement to get the word out fast, it took less 
than one month for the whole march to come 
together. As shown by the graph, over 60 
percent of people out about the march through 
social media.  The other ways that people heard 
about the march was through television and 
through friends. Television was around 12 
 
86 We put body, word, flags and posters to say that 
macho violence kills and not only when the heart 
stops beating. Because sexist violence also kills, 
slowly, when it restricts freedoms, political and 
percent and friends was under 10 percent. It also 
shows how powerful and widespread social 
media is.   
Every June 3rd, the Ni Una Menos 
movement marches, “Ponemos cuerpo, palabra, 
banderas y carteles para decir que la violencia 
machista mata y no sólo cuando el corazón deja 
de latir. Porque la violencia machista también 
mata, lentamente, cuando coarta libertades, 
participación política y social, la chance de 
inventar otros mundos, otras comunidades, otros 
vínculos”86  (niunamenos.org). By using the 
#niunamenos as the slogan for the June 3rd 
march, the hashtag was able to cross national 
borders and inspire other movements in 
neighboring countries.  
Strategies and Tactics 
The Ni Una Menos movement has been 
able to use social media to come up with 
strategies and tactics. Just one march gave the 
movement lots of media attention. El País 
stated, “Argentina is experiencing a time of 
great political turmoil and division in the middle 
of the electoral campaign. However, the 
mobilization of #NotOneLess has been so great 
that all candidates have backed this group’s 
demands” and La Nación described, “the 
demonstration managed to unite clashing flags 
under one slogan: shouting down femicide and 
changing a culture of violence. [It was] an 
encounter where people from all social classes, 
creeds, and ideologies visualized #NotOneLess” 
(Luengo 2018). The movement gained national 
attention and this could not have been done 
without the help of Twitter to get the word out. 
The creation of the Ni Una Menos movement 
relied on Twitter to spread the word about the 
movement, gain a greater audience, and get 
people to the street to march throughout 
Argentina.  
The Ni Una Menos continues to utilize 
social media as a way to keep people informed 
social participation, the chance to invent other 
worlds, other communities, other ties. 
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and create a call to action. A year after the first 
demonstration in June 2015, Ni Una Menos held 
a second rally in June 2016 where they used the 
hashtag #VivasNosQueremos87, which sites the 
march against gender violence that was held in 
Argentina (Fuentes 2019). On October 19, 2016 
there was a sporadic march in which the leaders 
of the Ni Una Menos organization used Twitter 
to mobilize the public. On October 12, 2016 
Lucia Pérez, was brutally murdered. The march 
on October 19, was inspired by Lucia Pérez and 
demanded an end to the violence of partiachy, 
the right to legal, safe, and free abortions, and 
for opening space for all our life 
(niunamenos.org). For this march, the Ni Una 
Menos movement used the hashtag 
#NosotrasParamos88, and they also adopted the 
hashtag #MiercolesNegro, taken the Polish 
women who just had a strike against a planned 
abortion ban and used the hashtag 
#BlackMonday. 
Social media is used to continue to 
mobilize people towards short term and long 
term solutions for femicide. One of the 
campaigns that Ni Una Menos ran was the “De 
la foto a la firm”89. In which the activists asked 
celebrities and public officials to do more to 
support the movement while they had been great 
with posting selfies and pictures, the activists 
wanted more. The organizers were asking the 
celebrities and public officials to sign a 
document in which they pledged to get 
resources to end violence against women. 
Through this campaign, the activists were able 
to get the issue of gender violence on the 
political agenda during a presidential election 
year. This got politicians talking about gender 
based violence throughout their political 
campaigns and made people more aware of the 
issue. This campaign utilized social media, 
paired with a call to action encouraging people 





The hashtags are what mobilized the 
people in the case of Argentina. A hashtag can 
be considered “technopolitics” meaning, “the 
centrality of uses of technology in the 
organization, communication and performance 
of collective action is contemporary social 
movements” (Fuentes 2019). By creating a 
hashtag of the slogan, it brought people 
together, and made it easy for people to see 
what Ni Una Menos as doing, as when you 
looked up the movement you would see the 
hashtag. The hashtag works “as  anchors to 
retrieve what has been said and done in 
response to femicide or gender violence more 
broadly, hashtag such as #NiUnaMenos enable 
movements to expand their base, exploiting 
dispersion, multiplicity and a-synchronicity” 
(Fuentes 2019). The use of all of the different 
hashtags allows the Ni Una Menos movement to 
expand, making it more well known and 
international while at the same time mobilizing 
the masses within a short time period.  
Relation to larger society 
Since 2015 those involved in the Ni Una 
Menos movement have fought to bring about a 
lot of change in their society. The Ni Una 
Menos movement has been extremely 
successful in making people aware of femicide 
in Argentina.  
In 2016, President Mauricio Macri 
created a national plan to fight violence against 
women in Argentina (“National Action Plan for 
the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of 
Violence against Women.” 2016). This plan was 
titled “The National Action Plan for the 
Prevention, Assistance and Eradication of 
Violence against Women” (“National Action 
Plan for the Prevention, Assistance and 
Eradication of Violence against Women.” 
2016). The goals of this plan were to create a 
network of women refuges, create a budget for 
the electronic tagging of violent men, introduce 
89  From picture to signature 
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gender violence in school curriculum, staff a 
telephone helpline for women, and gain access 
to microcredit to promote economic autonomy 
for women (“Argentina Announces New Gender 
Violence Plan.” 2016 and “National Action Plan 
for the Prevention, Assistance and Eradication 
of Violence against Women.” 2016). These 
were very ambitious goals for Argentina, but 
much needed as the femicide rate was 
continuing to increase.  
It has been three years since the creation 
of President Macri’s plan, and there has been 
little improvement. If anything, Argentina has 
seen an increase in femicide. In 2018, there 
were 19 femicides in the month of January. In 
January of this year, there were 30 femicides in 
31 days. This was an increase of 11 femicides in 
one month just a year apart. This has created 
some major movement within the activist 
communities in Argentina. Mujeres de la Matria 
Latinoamericana (MuMaLá), a feminist activist 
group, is calling for Argentina to declare a state 
of emergency. The goal of declaring a state of 
emergency to allow MuMaLá to get their budget 
back for two years, so then they can make 
breaking out of systemic violence a priority.  
Later this year, the Commissioner for 
International Cooperation and Development 
granted eight million Euro to Argentina to 
“boost efforts and strengthen institutions to 
make sure that women and girls never have to 
live in fear again” with the goal of achieving 
true gender equality and living in a larger 
society. This is great for Argentina, as they have 
been granted funds to help combat the ever 
growing issue of femicide. So far, the funds 
have yet to be allocated to a specific resource.  
The Ni Una Menos movement is still 
very active in Argentina. There most recent 
march was on November 25th, which was the 
International Day for the Elimination of 
Violence against Women (Santillana 2019). The 
Ni Una Menos movement led this movement 
with the message, “sexual violence is political 
violence” (Santillana 2019). Since 2015, the Ni 
Una Menos movement has been fighting to 
bring about equality to women.  
In an interview with the New York 
Times, cartoonist and writer Maitena 
Burundarena states,“The solution has to come 
from society, it won’t come from the state, not 
all men are like that, we have to win over the 
good ones, no right-thinking man can tolerate 
violence against women. But someone has to 
start teaching the ones who don’t understand it 
that women are not the property of men” (Goñi 
2015). The problem of femicide is so deeply 
rooted in their society that a few changes to the 
law might not make a difference. The Ni Una 
Menos movement is trying to change how 
society views and talks about femicide. Ni Una 
Menos is trying to prevent femicide from ever 
occurring again, and is doing this by trying to 
change the perception in society in Argentina 
that the killing of women is not okay.  
Counter Argument  
Social media can be dangerous for 
social movements. This paper argues that 
social media helps to galvanize people to 
the streets for the Ni Una Menos 
movement. But it is important to recognize 
that social media does not always work. 
Many people will argue that social media 
actually has no effect on a social 
movement. These people argue that 
“social media is an impressive patina that 
in actuality does little to fundamentally 
transform the way that human beings 
relate to each other in the real world” 
(Kidd 2016). Social media creates a 
barrier and it becomes hard for people to 
relate in the world of the internet. 
Malcolm Gladwell argues that people are 
motivated by close relationships. This 
would be high risk activism. People who 
are deeply connected to each other will 
make a greater difference for the cause. 
Social media does not allow for close 
relationships because they are all via the 
internet. Social media also does not 
encourage a lot of action. As seen in the 
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Ni Una Menos movement, “Social media 
encourages people to participate by 
posting and liking, not by going into the 
streets” (Kidd 2016). People do not mind 
liking or sharing a message, but when they 
actually have to do something, then people 
are not that reliable.  
Even though there can be an 
argument made for how social media does 
not play a role in social movements. In the 
Ni Una Menos movement social media 
played a large role and did inspire action. 
Social media was the driving force behind 
getting people to the streets to protest 
gender based violence in Argentina. It can 
be argued that the Ni Una Menos 
movement would not exist without the 
existence of Twitter.  
Conclusion 
The Ni Una Menos movement 
draws from the success of the Mothers of 
the Plaza de Mayo well at the same time 
integrating 21st century mass media to 
galvanize the public towards effective 
social and political change. By applying 
the resource mobilization theory to both 
the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the 
Ni Una Menos movement it is clear that 
they are both successful in gaining 
awareness and demanding justice. Even 
though the resources used by the groups 
were different, the Mothers still managed 
to inspire the Ni Una Menos movement. 
There is still more research to be done in 
this area. To further my research, I think it 
would be useful for someone to expand on 
what other countries who are facing a 
similar issue of femicide are doing to 
create change in their country, if they are 
doing anything.  
Gender-based violence is an 
extremely important subject that needs to 
be discussed. It is not just something that 
happens in other countries, it is happening 
right here in the United States. I think in 
general more research needs to be done in 
this area, as it is something that people 
tend to avoid because of the sensitive 
nature of the topic. It is our duty as 
researchers, academics and citizens to not 
let gender based violence become an 
epidemic.  
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a Way to Religious 
Tolerance 
Zahira Yusifova, Aydan Baghirli, Fatima 




Religion in its core has existed side by side with 
human beings for thousands of years, shifting its 
shape and form along the way. Started by the 
caveman societies using deities and supernatural 
powers to explain basic characteristics of nature, 
this kind of mindset provided comfort and 
motivation for early humans to continue 
discovering and researching their surroundings. 
Gradually, beliefs in the supernatural became 
more complex throughout the years, with deities 
encompassing every single action and aspect of 
life, with Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greece 
serving as prime examples of this shift. At this 
point, with Abrahamic religions being the 
predominant belief systems in the world, where 
one deity is the source and cause of everything, 
intolerance to other religions decreased steadily 
up to modern times. This, however, does not 
mean that discrimination and prejudice have 
totally vanished from the societies. While the 
Dark Ages with the Crusades and the Inquisitions 
around the globe are long gone, people identified 
by their religion and often belonging to a 
religious minority groups in a specific country 
face hardships and barriers in various parts of 
their lives. Even in communities with self-
proclaimed “progressive” views on the modern 
world, this kind of persecution still runs rampant. 
But in a world plagued with discrimination 
toward religious minorities, are there any 
 
90 Aykhan Kaya, “Multiculturalism and Minorities in 
Turkey,” in Challenging Multiculturalism: European 
countries capable of setting an admirable 
example to the rest? Those kinds of countries do 
exist, and all of them follow a similar pattern. 
 Thus, the goal of this paper is to discuss 
the existing cases of religious oppression around 
the world emphasizing Azerbaijan as a role 
model country to tackle religious intolerance and 
presenting multiculturalism as the best way to 
inculcate mutual respect and forbearance 
between people. To do so, we will review a 
number of relevant case studies underlining those 
that target on minimization of religious 
persecution, intolerance and disrespect. All in all, 
this review paper gives count to the existing 
problems around the globe followed up by the 
representation of Azerbaijan’s multicultural 
commitment as a role model in fostering peace 
and love among people of various nations and 
religions living in this country. The paper is 
accompanied by the due references and 
terminates with some concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review: 
2.1. The Concept of Multiculturalism and 
Religious Tolerance Globally  
In contemporary society, as an aftermath 
of globalization, the idea of multiculturalism is 
widely practiced in many countries. According to 
Kaya, nowadays, violence and racism are 
excluded from the gentrification of society; as a 
result, multiculturalism stands for an ability to 
integrate cultures, minority groups, races, and 
ethnicities within the borders of any country 
without sacrificing the original identity 90 . 
Multiculturalism in its prime was observed 
during the centuries of the Ottoman Empire91. 
Ottoman multiculturalism strongly intertwined 
with the word “tolerance”, which, for instance, is 
and continues to be a solid part of Turkish 
history, starting from the early days of the 
Ottoman Empire. That kind of multiculturalism 
Models of Diversity 2013, ed. Raymond Taras (Edinburg: 
Edinburg University Press, 2013), 313 
91  Ibid., 299 
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managed to positively affect economic, social 
and political issues. However, multiculturalism 
has its own share of opponents. West believes 
that “multiculturalism is perceived as the greatest 
safeguard against cultural conformity that leads 
to racism, fascism, and totalitarianism.” 92  In 
addition, thepropaganda of multiculturalism is 
used by many international organizations 
including European Union (EU). According to 
Kaya, the perspective of EU was discussed 
during a summit in December of 1999 and 
completely changed the political viewpoints in 
Turkey, opening up new religious perspectives 
on social, ethnic and political rights 93 . For 
instance, Kurds, Islamists, Armenians and a 
number of religious and ethnic groups in Turkey 
have become supporters of EU, seeing the EU as 
the beacon of political stability and peace. In 
addition to multiculturalism, tolerance is 
something that we should strive and fight for94. 
Tolerance is sometimes called a “Soft 
Multiculturalism”, where minorities should not 
face unfair discrimination and people of different 
cultures and customs should be tolerated and 
treated on a level playing field. 
The modern progressive world, however, 
did not manage to achieve the level of tolerance 
needed to eliminate discrimination, with 
numbers of countries speaking for themselves. In 
this respect, Marshal provides examples of 
China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Nigeria 
where the cases of religious oppression, mainly, 
violent attacks on religious minorities, have 
considerably increased 95 . Although religious 
majorities enjoy high levels of acceptability in 
their respective regions, religious minorities still 
 
92  Patrick West, “The Poverty of 
Multiculturalism,” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 94 
no. 374 (2005): 151  
93  Kaya, “Multiculturalism and Minorities in Turkey,” 
309. 
94 West, “The Poverty of Multiculturalism,” 152. 
95  Paul Marshall, “Patterns of Contexts of religious 
Freedom and Persecution,” The Brandywine Review of 
Faith and International Affairs 2 no.3 (2004). 
96 Gary Bouma, “Minority Religious Identity and 
Religious Social Distance in Australia,” in Australia: 
suffer from persecution. According to the 
biannual report presented by Australian Survey 
of Social Attitudes (AuSSA), local Australians 
were asked to specify their attitudes towards the 
members of certain religious groups. In this 
respect, Muslims and Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
ranked as the least preferred ones96. While the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were considered to be 
“Australians with an undesirable religion”, 
Muslims were treated simply as “undesirable 
immigrants”, both grouped in the category 
named “Keep out of Australia”. Due to Australia 
being a predominantly Christian country, Greek 
Orthodox, Anglican, and Presbyterian were 
widely accepted within the society97.  
Discrimination of the minority has 
always carried within itself numerous 
consequences that impact governmental 
decisions. In the United States, for example, 
based on a 1986 CBS/New York Times 
Immigration Poll, persecuted and historically 
oppressed religious denominations have a higher 
tendency to support mass immigration, also a 
disadvantaged minority, with Jews being the 
strongest supporters 98 . Non-religious 
communities were also involved in the poll, with 
atheists and agnostics holding pro-immigrant 
stances. A similar poll was conducted in 1988 in 
France and Germany, called Euro-Barometer 30, 
using random sampling. The results were no 
different from the results of the 1986 poll, with 
non-Catholics more likely to accept immigrants. 
On a 4-point scale, not belonging to the Catholic 
denomination increases the tolerance to migrants 
by .610 points 99 . That is, governments and 
Identity, Fear and Governance in the 21st Century 2012, 
eds. Juliet Pietsch and Haydn Aarons (Canberra: ANU 
Press, 2012), 52. 
97 Ibid., 53 
98 Joel Fetzer, “Religious Minorities and Support for 
Immigrant Rights in the United States, France, and 
Germany,” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 37, 
no. 4 (1998): 44.   
99  Ibid., 46 
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citizens shape their countries, and all of the 
examples above explicitly demonstrate that. 
Lester and Roberts consider that 
“religious tolerance requires the establishment of 
an environment where believers are able to feel 
comfortable expressing their religious 
identity.”100 However, in the modern world, it is 
not so difficult to come across nations that show 
intolerant and disrespectful attitude toward the 
religious minorities since, typically, people in 
such communities consider their beliefs as a 
correct religious approach and force members of 
religious minorities to accept their “true” 
religion. 101  As an illustration, in one of the 
biggest Eastern countries India, the members of 
Hindu right-wing parties in their speeches 
constantly emphasized that all minorities, 
including religious minorities, must become a 
part of Hindu culture.102 Therefore, they coerced 
people to accept their ideology. Even, in 2002, 
hundreds of Muslims who were considered as a 
religious minority, were killed by Hindus in 
Gujarat state with the help of the police and some 
public officials.103 This case is the most extreme 
form of religious intolerance that, unfortunately, 
resulted in the brutal murder of innocent people 
whose fault was merely their religious affiliation. 
Indonesia’s transition to democracy has been 
accompanied by religious violence where 
Catholic refugees from non-independent East 
Timor still languish in the western half of the 
island. 104  Another example is Laos which 
follows the patterns of Vietnam where the 
government has sought to control the major 
Buddhist group, and has also been violently 
repressive of the rapidly growing churches 
among the tribal people. 105  Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan make it almost impossible for non-
approved Muslim and Christian groups to have 
legal status, and then persecutes them as legal. 
 
100  Emile Lester and Patrick Roberts, “The Distinctive 
Paradox of Religious Tolerance: Active Tolerance as a 
Mean between Passive Tolerance and Recognition,” Public 
Affairs Quarterly 20 no. 4 (2006): 334. 
101 Martha Nussbaum, “Religious Intolerance,” Foreign 
Policy 144 (2004): 44. 
The list can be continued with numerous cases of 
religious oppression. Besides, statistics and 
records indicate that religious intolerance exists 
not only in the Eastern countries but also in many 
developed countries. In fact, it is terribly 
disappointing that religious intolerance of local 
people, which is a flagrant violation of human 
rights, is frequently encountered in the freedom 
of choice defender and supporter countries. As a 
result, all of these cases serve as proof of the 
degree of religious intolerance demonstrated by 
governments and people even in the biggest and 
the most powerful countries around the world.  
2.2. The attitude of Azerbaijan toward 
Religious Minorities 
At some historical point, Azerbaijan has 
also witnessed religious oppression. In 1920th 
when the Soviet regime was established in 
Azerbaijan, the Ministry of Education and 
Confession of the ADR (Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic) was abolished. Moreover, all religious 
teachings both in private and public schools were 
prohibited. One of the most significant days in 
Islamic religion – Ashura underwent criticism 
during the imperial time at the end of the 
nineteenth beginning of the twentieth century. 
And only with the acceptance of independence in 
1991 and the advent of a new government, all 
these bans were lifted.  
One aspect that makes a country 
multicultural is its geographical location; 
Azerbaijan, which is located in intersection of 
various cultures and civilizations, is one of these 
countries with multicultural population including 
such ethnic diversities as Udins, Ingiloys, Krizes, 
Hilalugs, Budugs, Tats, Talishs, Lezghins; 
immigrant diversities, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, 
Belarusians, Kurds, Jews, Greeks, Assyrians, 
Germans, Tatars; and finally, religious 
diversities, i.e. Muslims (≈94.2%), with Sunnis 
102  Ibid 
103  Ibid 
104   Marshall, “Patterns of contexts of religious freedom 
and persecution.” 
105  Ibid 
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(≈15%) and Shias (≈85%), also, Christians 
(≈4.6%), and Jews (≈1.2%), living together and 
enjoying their rights and traditions. Fortunately, 
the concept of multiculturalism as well as 
religious tolerance and respect are strongly 
supported by the current government, which has 
been selected by the local people. Today, 
government’s proper interferences including 
annual allocation of the state budget on religious 
needs, financial and moral support for language-
minority schools, and organization of religious 
and national celebrations, have more important 
impact on the integration of ethnic, religious, and 
cultural minorities within the country.106 While 
many governments do not allocate funds for 
religion, Azerbaijani government policy has 
always satisfied the cultural and religious needs 
of its citizens without any distinctions. 107 
Moreover, according to national policy, the 
Constitution of Azerbaijan ensures equal rights 
and opportunities to representatives of different 
nations in various work spheres. According to 
Kunina, Milli Majlis, a national assembly of 
Azerbaijan, consists of representatives of 
different ethnic diversities such as Russians, 
Lezghins, Kurds, Tats, Talishs and others. 108 
Consequently, delegates of the minority groups 
noticeably contribute to the development of the 
country. In his speech, the President Ilham 
Aliyev always points out that the “traditions of 
multiculturalism have always existed in 
Azerbaijan for centuries indeed, merely, it has 
been differently called, but the essence hasn’t 
changed”.109 The idea of multiculturalism in this 
country is strongly supported by the population. 
 
106 Ramiz Mehdiyev et al., The President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of 
Multiculturalism (Baku: BBMM Publisher, 2017), 362. 
107 Irina Kunina, “Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The 




109 Mehdiyev et al., The President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of 
Multiculturalism, 362 
110  Ibid., 496 
It is not random that decisions of a government 
about such crucial issues are successfully 
implemented; normally, they are implemented 
only when they get approval from the locals.110 
The decree of the President of Azerbaijan “On 
the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms and on 
the State Support for the Promotion of the 
Languages and Cultures of National Minorities, 
Smaller Peoples and Ethnic Groups Living in the 
Republic of Azerbaijan” was ratified by the 
government of the Republic of Azerbaijan; the 
President’s Office established a special 
department for national minorities’ support.111 
Additionally, Youth for Alliance of Civilization 
(YAOC), an organization of the United Nation’s 
Alliance of Civilization (UN AOC), was initiated 
in 2007.112 The main goal of this project was to 
gather 45 young leaders who represent various 
cultures and religions to participate in the process 
of solving conflicts created by religious and 
cultural phobias. According to Ahmadov, this 
movement was established with the purpose to 
raise awareness in young people about the 
cooperation against misunderstanding, 
misconception and extremism due to the fact that 
they are considered to be more vulnerable to 
negative ideological trends.113 Moreover, Global 
Youth Movement for AOC (GYMAOC) was 
founded to institutionalize this movement in 
April 2011 in Baku.114 According to President 
Ilham Aliyev, one of main goals of Azerbaijan is 
to enable everyone to benefit from financial 
development, growth of the oil industry, equal 
rights and choice of any belief. 115 
111 Kunina, “Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The 
Azerbaijani model.” 
112  Alpay Ahmadov, “GYMAOC” Initiative as an 
Instrument of Multiculturalism Process”, Baku 
International Forum (2011). 
http://bakuforum.az/multiculturalism-achievements-and-
problems/?fid=2254 
113  Ibid. 
114  Ibid. 
115 Mehdiyev et al., The President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of 
Multiculturalism, 362 
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          In line with the above-mentioned, 
national and religious minorities in Azerbaijan 
can benefit from social, cultural and educational 
aspects of life.  For instance, the existence of a 
Russian community within Azerbaijan gives 
opportunity for the Russians to read newspaper, 
to watch TV channels, and to receive education 
in their native language. People can get 
education in the Russian language not only at 
schools, but also at higher educational 
institutions, colleges and universities operating 
in the country.116 Ukrainian language is likewise 
respected and used by the Ukrainian faculty that 
operates at Baku Slavic University.117  
As previously mentioned, people can 
choose their beliefs without any restrictions by 
the Azerbaijani government; consequently, 
many places of worship such as Orthodox and 
Catholic Churches and Jewish Synagogues are 
as equally valued as Mosques in the country. 
For example, Holy Myrrhbearers Cathedral, 
built in Baku in the 20th century by 
philanthropist Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, was 
reconstructed in the 21st century by another 
Azerbaijani benefactor. Moreover, the 
government did not confine itself to just giving 
oral support to religious minorities but realized 
it with its actions. For instance, one of the oldest 
churches in the Caucasian region – the Church 
of Caucasian Albania – has been restored and 
provided its use for Christians with the 
command of the President.118 The church, 
blessed by pontiff Iohanne Pavel, was rebuilt by 
preserving traditions of the previous one.119 One 
of the ethnic and religious minorities living in 
Azerbaijan throughout its history have been 
followers of Judaism. During recent years, 
Azerbaijani government together with the 
Muslim community reconstructed an extant 
Jewish Synagogue. Another peculiarity that 
 
116  Ibid., 379 
117  Ibid., 368 
118  Ibid., 496 
119  Kunina, “Multiculturalism in the Caucasus: The 
Azerbaijani Model.” 
makes Azerbaijan different from other countries 
is its preservation of a place called the “Red 
Village” where Jews have lived for the longest 
period of time in one area in Azerbaijan. Neither 
the government nor local people interfere in the 
lives, traditions and religious practices of Jews 
in the country. For instance, in the streets of 
Azerbaijan, people can freely wear kippah, 
which is a Jewish male head covering. 
Moreover, such religious events as Shabbat and 
Torah dedication ceremony (the holy book in 
Judaism) are held without any prejudices by the 
Azerbaijani nation. In his press conference with 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
President Aliyev underlined that there were 
seven Synagogues and five Jewish schools in 
Baku such as Chabad Ohr Avner inaugurated in 
2010.120 Before that, Azerbaijani government 
had never allowed opening educational 
institutions for pious minority groups due to the 
fear of radical religious ideologies. Ignoring this 
risk, the former leader of Azerbaijan, Heydar 
Aliyev, who always placed a great emphasis on 
education and minority groups of the country, 
initiated establishment of the Jewish school in 
2003. His move is respected and blessed by 
many Jewish people and leaders.  Moreover, 
according to Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
Executive Director of the Federation of Jewish 
Communities Avraham Berkowitz commented 
on Aliyev’s humanitarian action toward Jews in 
the following way: “It is important that in the 
current international situation, the leader of a 
Muslim country can stand up to protect the 
rights of its minority.”121 
A strong support for religious 
institutions by Azerbaijanis exists not only 
inside the country but also outside it. According 
to Georgian Today newspaper, a memorandum 
was signed in 2014 between Azerbaijan and 
120  Mehdiyev et al., The President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev on The Azerbaijani Model of 
Multiculturalism, 504. 
121  Lev Krichevsky, “Azerbaijan to Legalize Jewish 
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Georgia so that the State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan Republic would provide free gas for 
churches, mosques, synagogues and monasteries 
in Georgia.122  
Today we can observe a certain number 
of schools and other educational institutions 
open for religious minorities where people do 
not only get education in their mother tongue 
but are allowed to celebrate and commemorate 
all important dates and days according to their 
nationalities and confessions. For instance, at 
the end of June - beginning of July Bashkir, 
Idel-Uralian, and Tatar nations of the country 
can celebrate a Sabantuy - a very old tradition 
among farming communities going back to the 
times when Bashkir and Tatar nations were 
roaming tribes. Yet, this all does not detach 
religious minorities from the mainstream 
country events and holidays. 
One of the controversial issues regarding 
the religious majority is a division of Islam into 
Shia and Sunni branches. The majority of 
people living in Azerbaijan are followers of 
Islam, which was divided into two groups such 
as Shia and Sunni. The division arose when the 
community was deciding who would replace the 
Prophet Mohammad when he died in 632 AD. 
Various features of these two groups triggered 
development of different systems of law and 
theology. Sixty-three percent of 43 countries 
have an official state religion named Sunni 
Islam, Shia Islam or just Islam.123 According to 
Abdo et al. the majority of Shias are rooted in 
Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, with its 
plurality in Lebanon, whereas Sunnis compose 
majority in more than forty countries from 
Morocco to Indonesia.124 Today, ancient 
 
122 socar.ge, 2014. 
123  Pew Research Center, “Many Countries Favor 
Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially,” Pew 
Research Center (2017). 
http://www.pewforum.org/2017/10/03/many-countries-
favor- specific-religions-officially-or-unofficially/ 
124 Geneive Abdo et al., “The Sunni-Shia Divide”, Council 
on Foreign Relations (2016). 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-
divide#!/sunni-shia-divide 
religious split has caused increased conflicts in 
the Middle East and Muslim countries.125 
Nevertheless, Muslims from these two groups 
have lived in Azerbaijan side by side without 
any struggle and problems for hundreds of 
years. Also, Sunnis and Shias can marry each 
other and pray at the same mosques. As Abdo et 
al. say, “They share faith in the Quran and the 
Prophet Mohammed’s sayings and perform 
similar prayers, although they differ in rituals 
and interpretation of Islamic law.”126 One of the 
reasons for people’s positive attitude toward 
religious freedom is that only 21% of 
Azerbaijanis believe that religion plays an 
essential role in their lives. Due to this low 
percentage of pious people, Azerbaijan is 
considered as one of the least religious (secular) 
countries in the world.127 As earlier indicated, 
those members of Sunnis and Shias have 
peacefully lived in several countries throughout 
the centuries, and it can be implied that 
Azerbaijan is on par with these countries.128 
Thus, all these mentioned examples once again 
prove that Azerbaijan is a multicultural country 
and is capable of sharing its experience with 
other countries to fight persecutions and 
discrimination in the world. 
Conclusion 
Absolute tolerance to every single 
individual, regardless of his/her ethnicity and 
obtained identity, is a utopian fantasy that can 
never be achieved due to human nature at its 
core, but achieving the best possible level of 
tolerance is a manageable task. Azerbaijan, with 
its rich and colorful history and experience of 
true discrimination at a time, has committed 
itself to reach that kind of level, and is on the 
125  Ibid.  
126  Ibid.  




128 Abdo et al., “The Sunni-Shia Divide.” 
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right route. Mutual respect, tolerance and 
understanding continually reign in the country. 
The practice demonstrates that in contrast to 
those countries where the governments and 
people give way to hate, aggression, oppression, 
disrespect and intolerance toward religious 
minorities, countries with religious tolerance 
and a multicultural approach are capable of 
rapid development in many fields. Usually, 
countries and their representatives claim to 
stand for tolerance and open-mindedness, but it 
is rare when a country delivers on that promise. 
If Azerbaijan and other countries guided by 
multiculturalism continue setting an example 
and become the frontrunners for religious 
tolerance, that trend of false promises will 
eventually decline. Many developed countries 
claim to be the bedrock of democracy and 
tolerance to people of all identities, but without 
basic equal treatment to all religious 
denominations, that original claim is worth the 
fraction of its actual meaning. Countries 
worldwide should dedicate their time to 
thoroughly analyze and come up with adequate 
solutions to religious intolerance issues. 
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